Preventing enemies from acting together is one of the principles Israel has followed since its foundation. Aside from the 3- and 2-front 'conventional power' wars that Israel has overcome in history, it faced a multi-actor hybrid coalition at a time when it thought that it had fully secured its 'genocidal' existence built on the reality of occupation, exile, and apartheid with the Abraham Accords.
One wonders what the Axis of Resistance's strategy will be if Israel's escalating attacks on Lebanon without closing the Gaza front reach a point where Hezbollah is overwhelmed. The possibility of other parties opening new fronts, in line with the 'Unity of the Fields' joke, raises the prospect of a regionalization of the war. This is precisely what the U.S. is trying to prevent by granting Israel 'safe genocide.'
Hezbollah's 'Palestinian support front' against the genocide in Gaza was an option that Israel should not have allowed. But Hezbollah's strategy of attrition has led to the evacuation of settlements in the north and has kept about a third of Israel's military capacity in the north, preventing it from moving into Gaza. It became a strategic priority for Israel to restore the north, and for Hezbollah not to allow any return to the north until a ceasefire was reached in Gaza.
Israel's intensified offensive to deprive Hezbollah of its command and leadership, to destroy its missile and rocket capacity, and to render its operators useless, was tied to the goal of returning the settlers to the north. It did not take long for Hezbollah to respond to Israel by replacing the top commanders killed and the 1,500 fighters who lost their eyes and hands in the pager terror.
Although the Israeli army claims to have destroyed 50 percent of Hezbollah's missile-rocket capacity in three days, developments on the ground do not confirm this. In the last few days, Hezbollah has expanded its operations from a range of 10-20 km to strategic targets at depths of 50-60 km. The previous day, missiles fell 120 kilometers away in the occupied West Bank. Yesterday, a Qadr missile was fired at the Mossad headquarters near Tel Aviv, 135 kilometers from the border. Hezbollah's strategic targets include the Ramat David Airbase southeast of Haifa, the Rafael military-industrial complex in the Zevulun valley, the munitions factory in the Zikhron area 60 km from the border, the Amjad base northwest of Lake Tiberias, the Nimra base west of the lake, the Ein Zeitim base northwest of Safed, the Yoav Barracks in the occupied Golan, and the Megiddo Airport west of Afula.
Hezbollah is also challenging Israel's promised new phases by deploying weapons it has never used before. So whatever the new phases are, Israel will have to do its calculation.
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In order to justify the massacre of civilians, as in Gaza, Israel is bombarding southern Lebanon in such a way as to make it uninhabitable, claiming that Hezbollah has placed missile launchers in houses. It aims to escalate the pressure on Hezbollah by forcing the region to migrate. This can also be seen as an effort to create the infrastructure for a buffer zone. There is a serious influx of migrants. But there are also scenes of disappointment for Israel: People in Sunni and Christian areas of Lebanon are welcoming Shiites from the south. Syria, exhausted by 13 years of war, has also opened its doors to refugees.
Until now, Israel kept telling the international community that its goal was not to start a war or invade Lebanon. According to an Israeli official who spoke to CNN, Netanyahu also told the security cabinet on Monday that the goal was to disengage Hezbollah from the war with Hamas. The cabinet decided to raise the level of military operations every day. Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi said they were preparing for a new phase.
What if Hezbollah doesn’t change its plan despite the increasing intensity of the operations? Ultimately, two outcomes must be achieved before the settlers can return: Hezbollah's closure of the Gaza support front and the withdrawal of its fighters north of the blue line, north of the Litani River.
According to Israeli military experts, a buffer zone inside Lebanon is essential to achieve the goal. For this, bombardment is not enough, a ground invasion is also necessary. So the process is inevitably heading towards occupation.
Does Israel really want this? Hezbollah is a deterrent in a ground war. Israel experienced this in 2006.
Netanyahu's first phase of terror, bombing and assassination did not yield the desired result. Escalation was met with escalation. Buffer against buffer. In other words, Israel is pursuing a strategy to evacuate the northern part of the border and Hezbollah the southern part.
While Israel dreamed of seeing white flags, Hezbollah raised red flags. The day before yesterday, it announced that it was fighting not only to support Palestine but also to protect Lebanon.
In response, Halevi spoke for the first time yesterday about preparing for a ground operation. Whether this is a strategy to increase pressure or preparation for the inevitable, we do not know for now.
Those who follow Hezbollah closely agree that Hezbollah's record does not include raising the flag of surrender, but it knows how to negotiate using firepower. It does not react emotionally and pursues long-term strategic goals. It absorbs tactical defeats and then focuses on preventing Israel from turning them into strategic victories.
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As far as Israel is concerned, in three or five days, half of Hezbollah's missile-rocket stockpile has been destroyed, and in a few more days it will finish off the rest! But the escalation on the diplomatic front suggests otherwise.
The United States and France, as well as their allies in the region, have stepped in to give Tel Aviv the result it seeks. According to Al-Akhbar newspaper, the U.S. on Saturday sent a short message to both Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri and Prime Minister Najib Mikati. The message said that 'the doors of diplomacy are closed and there is no longer any room for negotiations'. This was a threat. Later, Mikati received another message by phone: “Washington can no longer control the Israelis.”
French special envoy Jean-Yves Le Drian also met with Chief of Staff Joseph Aoun, Berri, and Mikati. The messages conveyed through different channels seem to have come out of the same source: “If Hezbollah does not back down, no one will be able to pressure Israel.”
The demands of the intermediaries converge on one point: Israel wants to create a 10-kilometer-deep buffer zone free of people. It will not back down from this. The only solution is to make the concessions Israel wants. If the demands are rejected, there will be more attacks.
After 11 months of pressuring the 'Popular Front' by saying “I am trying to get Israel to accept a ceasefire in Gaza to prevent the war from becoming regionalized”, and now trying to lure Hezbollah into a bargain with a makeshift ceasefire in Gaza, the United States is in any case preparing itself for possible escalations. To this end, the Pentagon is sending additional forces to the Middle East. Airborne troops have already arrived in Southern Cyprus, NATO's new outpost.
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As Hezbollah suffers blows, the spotlight is back on Iran. What if Israel attempts to invade... How then will the concept of 'unity of the fields' between the Axis of Resistance, which Iran has been emphasizing for several years, manifest itself? Iran is delaying its promised retaliation for the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh. Lots of reasons for this delay comes to mind: To increase pressure on Israel for a ceasefire in Gaza, to avoid falling into the Israeli trap of pitting the United States against Iran, to prevent President Masoud Pezeshkian from getting off to a bad start with the West, to avoid sabotaging contacts in New York, to keep the door open for a return to nuclear negotiations, and to use the chance to negotiate with the United States for all this, etc.
Just as the Israelis believe that in order to bring down Iran, it is necessary to crush the Lebanese part, the Iranians see Lebanon and Syria as the frontline of Iran's defense. That is why it has long been predicted that Iran will not allow any option that dismantles Hezbollah.
Pezeshkian, who has no experience in diplomacy, said some things in New York about Iran's position that were considered 'novice'. “Hezbollah cannot stand alone against a country that is defended and supported by European countries and the United States,” was one of them. Another was that “Iran is ready to lay down its arms if Israel also disarms.” Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi argued that the president did not say anything on the record about laying down arms. He also said that Hezbollah was capable of defending the country against any aggression and flattening Israeli bases, while Iran could not remain indifferent to developments. While Pezeshkian is in New York, Iran is unlikely to retaliate or make moves to reassure Hezbollah. Hezbollah is not at the point of “Oh, I'm finished, help me.” The allegations that Hezbollah asked Iran to intervene and that Iran responded that it was not the right time to do so may be dismissed as they originate from Israel. The Gulf media, which is subtly working for Israel, is also broadcasting that Iran and Syria have betrayed Hezbollah.
Although backed by Iran, Hezbollah takes strategic decisions within the Lebanese reality. “Decisions are taken in Tehran and implemented in Beirut” is not sound. The two most important expressions that define the functioning of this position are 'strategic calculation' and 'strategic patience'.
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There is already a certain level of interaction between the fronts. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq occasionally shows itself with targeted drone and rocket attacks. Yemen's Ansarullah, which has banned Israeli-linked ships from the Red Sea, also occasionally fires missiles and UCAVs.
Perhaps the new line to focus on here is Syria. Since October 7, Syria, which is frequently subjected to Israeli bombardment, has led to different conclusions with its cool-headed stance. There have been interpretations that Syria is looking out for improved relations with the Arab League, that it does not want to be part of a war started by Hamas, which turned its back on Damascus in 2012, and that it is trying to distance itself from Iran. The Gulf media attached great value to this stance. But despite everything, Syria did not cut its ties with Lebanon. Since 2013, Hezbollah has taken the lead in mobilizing against Syria's collapse and paid a heavy price. For Damascus' security doctrine, keeping Lebanon out of the picture would mean withdrawing from Syria's line of defense. This is why Assad, in his first meeting with the new cabinet, instructed them to “do whatever it takes for Lebanon”.
Of course, for a country that has been badly battered in 13 years, whose army is exhausted, whose defense capacity has been decimated, whose human resources have been depleted, whose economy has collapsed, and which still does not control a third of its territory, to open a front against Israel may have suicidal connotations. Given that the United States is based in northeastern Syria to protect Israel, to cut Iran's arms, and, if necessary, to take on Damascus, Assad may be right to be cautious. While Syria is struggling with an armed rebellion, the situation in the occupied Golan Heights has completely changed in Israel's favor.
One possible scenario is the opening of the Golan front if Hezbollah is in a difficult situation. The second scenario could be the opening of a support line to Lebanon through the Iraq-Syria connection. At this point, there has been a remarkable development: Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the highest Shiite authority in Iraq, called for mobilization for Lebanon, even though he is not in line with Iran's regional agenda. Sistani's words will be seen as a fatwa and will mobilize the Shiites. As was the case with the 2014 call for the Popular Mobilization Forces against Daesh. The Iraqi government will be forced to adopt a policy based on this call. And the Iraqi scene has moved quickly.
There is also talk of mobilizing militias from Yemen to Lebanon.
According to Haaretz, Israeli military officials are anxiously watching the arrival in the Golan of some 40,000 people from Syria, Iraq and Yemen. They are waiting for Nasrallah's call to war. “We will intervene in Syria and make it clear to Assad that we will not accept their presence here,” the official said. In any case, Israel never misses a clue to strike Syria.
Israel could become even more aggressive in order to prevent the opening of a front from Syria. It could also reactivate the Islamist groups that were put on the scene in 2011. Some of these groups received Israeli aid in Golan between 2012 and 2016. They also harbor a great hatred for Hezbollah. This hatred is also high among Turkish-backed groups. The fact that the joint forces, which includes groups such as the Hamza Division and the Sultan Suleiman Shah Division, celebrated Hezbollah's heavy losses by distributing sweets is a clear indication of this. In Daraa, armed groups have also been reactivated against the Syrian government. Jihadists in Idlib have also stepped up their attacks on Syrian army positions.
None of this can be considered independently of the Lebanese-Israeli tension.