The talks in İmralı were initiated to overcome the fears sparked by developments in Syria, but what is envisioned for the "Apoist" structure in "Bin Hat" remains ambiguous. Either a roadmap was devised on this matter but was deliberately left unclear—a kind of knowing silence.
This ambiguity may be explained by the desire to prevent potential sabotage from nationalist, state-centric factions that expect the elimination of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), People's Defense Units (YPG), and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and would see any contrary development as the "opening of the path to a Kurdish state under American protection."
Alternatively, since Americans are also involved, it may be expected that the roadmap will take shape along the way.
The Kurdish issue requires setting multiple tables with different interlocutors because the issue has become regionalized, even internationalized. Abdullah Öcalan is the primary interlocutor in İmralı, but achieving a comprehensive solution without coordination with Baghdad, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, Qamishli, Damascus, Tehran, and Washington is impossible.
If Öcalan has called for the end of armed struggle without referencing any guarantees, it can be assumed that the state recognizes that the Kurdish movement will not simply dissolve with the disbanding of the PKK and is therefore prepared to make certain adjustments or positional changes.
Once the PKK lays down its arms, it will enter a new phase. This can be interpreted as the Kurdish movement in Turkey transitioning to democratic politics without regime change. However, there is a de facto autonomous structure in Syria. Therefore, a functional negotiation would likely not mean nullifying all gains but rather integrating the existing structure into the new Syria, even if it stays away from federal forms. In other words, reconciliation necessitates parameter changes on both sides.
During the process that began in 2013 and was buried in 2015, the disruptive factor was Rojava being a red line.
In 2014, Cemil Bayık told me in Qandil:
"Turkey cannot develop a solution in the north by eliminating the status of the Kurds in Rojava. If it wants a solution, it must accept the achievements of the Kurds in Rojava."
Back then, our analyses led us to this conclusion: preserving the autonomous structure in Syria and achieving status for the Kurds could be an equivalent to the PKK disarming.
Since this equation couldn’t be established, the process stalled. Meanwhile, American involvement became decisive in shaping the SDF's position. In the new phase following the collapse of the Assad regime, Israel altered the equation by expanding its intervention and diving headfirst into Syria. Israel has been urging the Trump administration to keep American forces in Syria and continue supporting the SDF. This has raised alarm levels in Ankara.
So, under these new conditions, what are the chances that Ankara will approach Syria differently than it did during the 2013 negotiations?
According to the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) Spokesperson Ömer Çelik, Ankara interprets disarmament as not only the elimination of the PKK in Iraq but also the YPG. "The terrorist organization PKK, YPG, PYD, and all its extensions must lay down their arms," he says. This sounds like a repeat of 2013. But is it really?
All indications within the Kurdish movement suggest that the call definitely does not cover Syria. SDF General Commander Mazloum Abdi stated: "Mr. Öcalan's call is directly to the PKK, aiming at the disarmament of PKK guerrillas. It is not directly about our region or our forces." Regarding the letter he received from Öcalan, Abdi also said, "It did not directly address the SDF or this region but mentioned achieving a ceasefire and resolving the Syrian crisis through peaceful means."
Abdi also wants the U.S. to remain in Syria until a decentralized solution is guaranteed.
Zübeyir Aydar of the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) European branch responded to ANF's question on whether disarmament also applied to the SDF or YPG: "No, that's not true. When the President writes or speaks, he knows exactly what is directed where. He had previously said the SDF should not dissolve within HTS. There must definitely be a status for Kurds there. The solution President Apo proposes is for the entirety of Kurdistan. Turkish media may interpret this differently as part of psychological warfare, but we know what’s what and act accordingly."
Logically, no negotiation in İmralı can exclude Syria. The ambiguity lies in what is envisioned.
Fevsa Yusuf of the PYD Presidential Council also stated that Öcalan aims to prevent plans to eliminate the Kurdish people: "Today, the biggest obstacle to dialogue between the autonomous administration and Damascus is Turkey… I believe this step will have a positive effect on achieving a lasting solution in Syria."
If Öcalan has indeed proposed a solution for the entirety of Kurdistan (which would make sense since the PKK is active in all four parts), how can the assertion in his call that "nation-states, federations, administrative autonomy, and culturalist solutions do not respond to the historical sociology of society" be interpreted in the Syrian context, where a de facto situation exists?
The SDF is also using all its leverage in negotiations for integration to secure some form of status.
Öcalan not mentioning status in his letter does not mean these issues were not discussed in İmralı.
Are there no clues in the letter to Abdi? From what I’ve gathered, the letter includes greetings, assessments on women and society, ideological analyses, and some recommendations. It does not mention disarmament. The three main suggestions in the letter are roughly as follows:
End the clashes at Karakozak and Tishrin Dam as soon as possible; this is a ploy to distract you and prevent you from reaching Damascus.
Do not act alone; build alliances with those around you.
Engage in dialogue with hegemonic powers, but be cautious of their agendas. Do not fall under their influence; rely on your own strength.
The third recommendation was also part of the "Third Way" approach at the start of the Syrian crisis. This may unsettle factions seeking Israeli protection.
The lack of direct address to the SDF in the call could suggest that the Syrian dimension has been postponed, set aside, or that there is an unspoken interim solution. When speaking of postponement or separation, the U.S. factor comes into play. Under current conditions, the U.S. does not intend to abandon the SDF. If İmralı's call becomes a decision through the KCK congress, Ankara might use this result to influence Trump's Syria policy.
However, the U.S. interpretation of Öcalan's call does not align with Ankara's expectations.
A spokesperson for the White House National Security Council said, "This is an important development. We hope it helps our Turkish allies feel more at ease regarding the U.S.'s anti-ISIS partners."
In other words: "Since the PKK has dissolved itself, the threat to Turkey is gone, the justification for intervention in Syria no longer exists, and the U.S. has resolved its contradiction with its NATO ally while supporting the SDF."
But the message Ankara might want to convey is different: "Turkey is making peace with the Kurds; it may even act as a protector of Kurds in Syria. Turkey will do what is necessary against ISIS alongside regional partners. The U.S. no longer needs to stay in the region."
In any case, a new parameter is entering the file that could change the course of Turkish-American dialogue. It is still difficult to predict where this new input will bring the parties together.
So when the "terrorism" justification is lifted, will the Turkish barrier still block Syrian Kurds from negotiating their own internal solution with Damascus?
Clues to Ankara's potential stance can be seen in a piece believed to be planted in the daily Hürriyet: "There are two options for the YPG structure in Syria. The first is to reach an agreement with the Syrian state and become part of the new state structure. The second is to continue terrorist acts… Ankara believes the best option for the YPG is to become part of the Syrian state through negotiations."
If this article is not merely a precaution to prevent Kurds from concluding that "Öcalan sold out the cause," then it suggests a middle path.
A potential interim formula is a solution where PKK cadres withdraw from Syria, the SDF is integrated into the system, Kurdish identity and language are constitutionally recognized, and powers are devolved from the center to local authorities.
Pointing to the DEM Party as the address of legal politics in Turkey while crossing out the PYD's civilian wing in Syria is an unsustainable contradiction for any peace process.
In short: Syria is definitely not off the table, but it remains on hold.