“There is a victory that grows out of defeat”
This is a line from Sezai Karakoç's poem 'O Beloved', which President Tayyip Erdoğan loves and recites all the time... Since the Arab Spring in 2011, many “defeats” have passed by that touch this line, magnifying not victory but defeat!
The co-leadership of the Greater Middle East Project (BOP) and the role of Turkey as a “model country” that the U.S. had assigned to Erdoğan had encouraged them, the Arab Spring had created further enthusiasm and investments were made in the Muslim Brotherhood axis against the so-called ‘Shia Crescent.’ However, the calculation did not work out in any of the countries hit by the turbulence.
In Egypt, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the Minister of Defense and Chief of General Staff of the Muslim Brotherhood government, became Erdoğan's first nightmare with his popular coup on July 3, 2013. The sign of Rabia (four fingers), referring to the Rabaa al-Adawiya Square in Cairo where the Muslim Brotherhood was suppressed, was used to condemn the 'coup plotter' Sisi, but it was also used in domestic politics in Turkey.
Although it was later transformed into “One nation, one state, one flag, one homeland” in line with the spirit of the AKP-MHP partnership, the Rabia symbol disappeared from the agenda during the normalization process with Sisi. Although it habitually settled in Erdoğan's hand, it lost its context.
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Normalization, although needed by both sides, was achieved thanks to Erdoğan's 'U' turns. Sisi was assured of many demands, including suppressing the Muslim Brotherhood based in Turkey. As they moved from the consolation of 'dignified loneliness' to 'discredited multiplicity', they should update the verse to “There is a defeat that grows with defeat.”
There were so many calculations: There was establishing a base on Sudan's Suakin Island and becoming the new Ottoman of the Red Sea; there was wiping out the Egyptian-backed eastern forces in Libya and opening a big door from North Africa; there was disrupting the 'alliance of evil' in the Eastern Mediterranean with the 'Blue Homeland' fallacy; there was saying 'we are back' to everyone from Aden to the Gulf by clashing with the Saud-Emirates-Egypt axis. The ambitions were frustrated by incompetence.
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Realpolitik imposed itself; interests were redefined. Of course, there are many things that can be said to make 'U' turns credible. The one who opens the new page cannot be held accountable for the old one.
“Normalization with Egypt is important to disrupt the energy equation that favors Greece and Southern Cyprus and to determine maritime jurisdictions.” This is the most magical sentence that makes sense of the disgraceful turns. Didn't the maritime jurisdiction agreement with a part of divided Libya disrupt this equation? Isn't this what was announced previously?
Yes, there was one thing that was broken: Egypt, in a retaliatory move, signed a partial maritime jurisdiction agreement with Greece, thus scuttling the Ankara-Trablus agreement.
But even in normalization, it is assumed that Egypt will play the game Ankara wants, much to the chagrin of the Greeks. It is a dream. It is likely that there will be a partial agreement between Turkey and Egypt on a non-contentious longitude and Turkey will shoot itself in the foot in Libya. Egypt will not upset Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration for Turkey.
In Libya, where the two countries are facing each other, the picture is quite complicated for both Ankara and Cairo. Consequently, both sides are focusing on protecting their interests without raising their hands. Until the conflict in Libya is resolved and a joint administration is established, the strategic agreements signed with the transitional governments in Tripoli have no future. Their legitimacy is questionable. While Cairo continues to keep its reservations about Turkey's calculations on the table, it believes that a future united Libya cannot ignore Egypt. It is, after all, a big border neighbor.
In his press conference with Erdoğan, Sisi revealed that Cairo's sensitivities have not changed. “Holding elections, ensuring security and the departure of armed forces is an important issue for the future of Libya,” he said. With its policy, Ankara made it easier for the parties sabotaging the election process. Is there a need for an additional description of the foreign forces that are asked to withdraw? Sisi seems to have successfully put his words on the table.
As for the Muslim Brotherhood, Egyptian dissidents broadcasting from Istanbul were silenced as a confidence-building measure during the exploratory talks. Allegedly, just before Sisi's visit, the dissidents were warned that 'any negative attitude towards the guest would lead to deportation'. Because of these steps, the Muslim Brotherhood issue is not a simple issue that Cairo can simply close. Sisi remains vigilant about the Muslim Brotherhood. For the time being, Sisi apparently trusts Erdoğan's high pragmatism as long as bilateral interests are pursued.
Of course, there were some who expected that the new chapter with Turkey would open the door of compassion for the Muslim Brotherhood. Last month, the Muslim Brotherhood's London branch proposed a compromise that called for the release of imprisoned members of the organization in exchange for withdrawing from political activity for 10 or 15 years. Egyptian politicians rejected the initiative, citing the organization's inconsistent record, according to Asharq al-Awsat. On several previous occasions, imprisoned members have written letters expressing their readiness to sever ties with the organization and asking the state for forgiveness. There were attempts of this kind before Sisi's visit. None of them were reciprocated. Erdoğan cannot get such an offer accepted by saying “Brother Sisi.”
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Although there are mistrusts on certain issues, the parties feel the need to redefine where their interests lie. The need to reconcile interests becomes the foundation of normalization.
Above all, it is self-interest that drives the arrogance of politics. From the beginning, the business circles have not taken the political crisis too seriously. Turkish companies' investments in Egypt are steadily increasing. The reason is simple: Production costs are low, incentives are high, and it is advantageous to sell goods produced in Egypt to other continents.
For instance, goods produced by foreign investors in Egypt's Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZs) can be imported into the U.S. quota-free and duty-free. According to DEİK, the 15 QIZs are particularly attractive for Turkish companies operating in the textile, ready-to-wear, leather, food, and beverage sectors. There are two conditions for customs exemptions to the U.S.: The domestic input rate must be 35 percent and the input rate from Israel must be 10.5 percent.
In addition, Egypt has free trade agreements with seven countries from the Middle East and Africa, as well as with the EU and MERCOSUR. Egypt is also a member of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA), and the Pan Arab Free Trade Area (PAFTA). These agreements, which break down or erode customs, make Egypt an important export channel for foreign investors. Egypt's domestic market is also quite large. This is why Turkish companies are anchoring in Egypt. This also softens the political space.
There are other catalysts for normalization. UCAVs and defense industry products are among them. Turkish UCAVs that went to Ethiopia, which was on the brink of war over Egypt's Renaissance Dam, pushed Cairo to seek balance by acquiring the same weapons. A military delegation from Egypt visited Baykar and TAI last May.
Moreover, Ethiopia's attempt to establish a naval base in Somaliland has aligned the interests of Turkey and Cairo, which are based in Somalia. Turkey needs to calibrate its relations with Ethiopia and Egypt. The sale of UCAVs, while escalating, can also dynamite relations. Turkey, which maximized relations with Ethiopia to squeeze Egypt, could now lose one of Africa's biggest gateways if it does the opposite. On the other hand, Egypt is cooperating with Somalia militarily against Ethiopia's move to Somaliland. This, in turn, has the potential to balance Turkey's military presence in Mogadishu, which could put Ankara on edge.
Energy partnership is another catalyst. In the shadow of sanctions against Russia, Turkey is looking to diversify its sources by increasing its LNG purchases from Egypt. But rebuilding the equation in the Eastern Mediterranean requires much more than a shift from 'Sisi the murderer' to 'Brother Sisi.'
The reopening of the RO-RO line between Mersin and Alexandria is another catalyst in the face of transportation problems.
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The Arab press emphasizes the visit as a 'historic visit.' This is a victory for Sisi. This normalization may increase dialogue between the two countries on regional issues. But as Erdoğan said, it is a hypothetical conclusion that Cairo and Ankara's positions overlap on many issues. Erdoğan may also be looking for Sisi's contribution when talking about a new page with Syria. During his visit to Cairo, Erdoğan reportedly asked Sisi for mediation. The same expectation was formed after the normalization with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. It is impossible for Sisi or other Arab leaders to influence Assad when the normalization model Erdoğan has in mind has no equivalent in Damascus. Moreover, if they are hoping for Sisi to help the political stance he overthrew in Egypt to come to power in Syria, it means that they have not learned any lessons from what has happened so far. Doesn't Sisi's reference to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk when talking about bilateral relations show where he stands in the face of the political Islamist agenda? The return to 'Brother Sisi' did not happen by putting forward conditions; the return to 'Brother Assad' may not happen in any other way.