Erdoğan’s grand plan

Erdoğan has just finished his party AKP’s congress. From now on, he will focus all his energy on “reforms and preparations for the elections.” This grand plan will have two main axes. The first axis lists 5 topics for 'reforms':

- Economic Transformation

- Green and Digital Transformation

- Social Policies

- Judiciary and Fundamental Rights

- Political and Administrative Arrangements

The 'process', which has so far proceeded with the İmralı Island delegation traffic, which the government calls “Turkey without Terror,” is also being discussed together with these headings.

The second 'main axis' is to pave the way for the leader who will achieve such ambitious goals, and at the same time achieve them with what can be more or less predicted by past government activities in these areas, namely of course Erdoğan, to become a presidential candidate once again. Who needs 'reform' in the economy, green, digital, social policies, judiciary and fundamental rights, politics and administration unless he is 'in charge'? 

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Then, we are witnessing the transfer of MPs. The MPs who were sitting in the opposition seats yesterday are now the central executive of the ruling party. There is also a search for 'equality' here: The CHP also receives MP transfers from other parties, why don't those who criticize the government for this not say anything about it?

Of course, it has never been welcomed, even within the borders of bourgeois democracy, when a member of parliament who was voted to Parliament by the electorate of a political party moves to another party for one reason or another, especially if there is a feeling that they are 'benefiting' from this, and if this situation comes to the fore in a way that hurts the public conscience. However, there is more than a 'transfer between parties' here. Since the transition to the presidential system, politics has been progressing in the ruling and opposition blocs, with different parties coming together and formulating/testing different electoral strategies.

In other words, there is a big 'opposition party' that objects to the course of events, including the new system itself, and a big 'ruling party' that says 'keep going'. In the last presidential election, this is how a two-leader/two-bloc race was organized, with Erdoğan on one side and Kılıçdaroğlu on the other. Considering that one of these blocs means objection to the course of events and the other means approval, transfers from opposition parties to the ruling party should be evaluated differently from transfers between opposition parties.

One might say, “There is no Nation’s Alliance left.” However, both the voters who voted and the grounds for objection are still intact. In fact, the post-election situation in terms of the economy, fundamental rights and freedoms, and judicial practices is getting worse for an increasing number of 'voters'. This is also why the main opposition party, which the government insists on labeling as 'incompetent', 'disorganized', and 'shady', has consistently emerged as the first party in the polls. The government is obviously trying to get out of this difficult situation by manipulating the parliamentary arithmetic in its favor with the promise of a 'series of reforms' and the transfer of MPs. Obviously, it will continue to do so until the elections. That being the case, can the 'transfers' of MPs who yesterday criticized the system with fiery statements in the opposition ranks to the ruling party administration seats today be evaluated in the same way as intra-opposition transfers?

Even if it is evaluated, will the opposition voters be convinced?

These are difficult questions for Erdoğan's plan…

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Back to the plan… 

With the recent transfers and the MPs belonging to different parties in the parliament, the power of the government in an early election vote has reached 324 (AKP+MHP+HÜDA-PAR+DSP). If an agreement is reached with New Welfare, with which the party has had a strained relationship recently, the four deputies there would bring the total to 328 deputies. What's left for 360 to decide on an early election! 

The president can also decide on early elections, but in that case, he cannot run for re-election. However, the issue is mainly about him being able to run again. Therefore, it is clear that the government will push for new transfers and want to close the gap as much as possible until the day of this vote. And what if it doesn't happen? In other words, what will happen if 360 deputies are not ready to vote on a date the government wants - which they themselves say will be November 2027? There, it is explained that the 'opposition running away from the elections' slogan will be used, and the opposition will be forced to agree to 'early elections'. In other words, the opposition, which is now saying, “If there is no early election in 2025, let it be on time in 2028”, will be forced to say yes to an election in November 2027... And will it?

The answer to this question will be given by the opposition, whose morale gained in the local elections was first battered by the processes of 'normalization' and then 're-normalization' that started with the appointment of a trustee to replace Esenyurt Mayor Ahmet Özer.

The opposition bloc needs a performance that can keep the opposition alive, together, and creative both in the Parliament and in the field, that can reduce losses and increase gains, without surrendering to predictive wisdom such as “DEM Party will get closer to the government with the İmralı process anyway”. Can the announcement of Ekrem İmamoğlu's presidential candidacy alone achieve this?

This is the question the opposition bloc will seek an answer to in the face of Erdoğan's grand plan that is more or less taking shape. The most difficult question in politics...