Erdoğan’s Syria baggage and delegation of rookies

Shaping Syria requires more than having a government that will write checks to Turkish contractors and having Turkish-speaking cadres. When HTS was in Idlib, it was dependent on Turkey. Now that it controls Damascus, its options have multiplied. And it also has to nod in all directions to overcome the obstacles of its own abysmal record.

While they all share the common goal of toppling the Assad regime, when it comes to rebuilding the country, some countries from the Gulf and Western blocs tend to start the diplomatic discourse with the “Turkish problem in Syria.”

By projecting the image of a “playmaker” and the “new owner of Syria,” Ankara has inflamed others to establish diplomatic contacts with Damascus.

On the one hand, it serves the goal of legitimizing HTS. On the other hand, it makes those who look at the issue as “Iran left and Turkey came” say “Let's not leave Damascus to the Turks. Engagement is engagement, help is help.”

This competition will not only help HTS to get a clean slate on terrorism lists, but it will also balance Turkey and make its job more difficult in certain areas.

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First and foremost, Israel sees Syria's removal from the Middle East equation as a major victory, and is already expanding the occupation and destroying Syria's entire military presence, aiming for as weak a neighbor as possible. Syria's recovery, rebuilding its army and arsenal, and then taking positions against the occupation in the Golan Heights, Quneitra, Daraa countryside and Damascus countryside is a future that must be eliminated.

Turkey has serious ambitions to train and equip the new Syrian security forces. It wants to bring its experience from Libya and Somalia. This does not mean that Ankara wants a very strong Syria. In essence, Erdoğan is investing in a grateful and dependent neighbor. But Israel does not exclude the potential for future interaction between the Islamist forces taking the reins in Syria and organizations like Hamas, even if they close Hezbollah's route. For the time being, HTS is displaying a pragmatism in which its priority is to drive a stake in Damascus and avoid incurring the wrath of Israel and its Western backers by remaining silent on occupationist moves that threaten Syria's and Jordan's water supplies. According to sources close to the government, Ankara is also the source of the approach that says “keep quiet against Israel”.

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The possibility of Turkey acquiring a land or naval base in Syria is also seen by Israel as a potential problem. Israel wants its freedom to monitor and punish an entire geography, from Palestine and Lebanon to Syria and Iraq, to be unhindered.

I am talking about a new situation that is coded as a problem in the regional design in Tel Aviv's mind, irrespective of the fact that Erdoğan has been diligently looking out for Israel for 23 years, despite their mutual quarrels, that he has not stopped cooperating during the genocide in Gaza, that NATO bases in Turkey are at the service of the Jewish state and that he has always coddled the Jewish lobbies in Washington.

The Israeli government's Nagel Committee preaches that a Syria allied with Turkey would be more dangerous than Iran. In fact, there is no indication that Erdoğan's Turkey, which has not taken any real measures to challenge Israel since Oct. 7, 2023, can be considered in a scenario of conflict with the Jewish state. Of course, Erdoğan can say the words that HTS leader Abu Mohammed al-Julani could not make him say. Yesterday, for example, he said, “Sooner or later, Israel will withdraw from the occupied territories.” This was triggered by Israel's involvement in the Kurdish file, its lobbying in the US in favor of the SDF, its proposal for an international conference on the canton system in Syria, and its threat to Ankara's new partner, the HTS leadership, at some stage. In the end, Israel is controlling all actors in Syria, friend and foe alike. Erdoğan deserves to receive a “medal of merit” from Israel for his contribution to the elimination of the “Axis of Resistance” from Syria. For Turkey, the conflict scenario lacks context. But Israel is a paranoid entity! According to MEE, Turkey took the first step towards a de-escalation mechanism with the Israeli army. The intelligence agencies of both countries maintain routine contacts.

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Inevitably, Syria's reconstruction process may fuel rivalries among many countries and interest groups. But the strategic configuration calls for a duel that goes beyond rivalry to include breaking bones. The prospect of Turkey acquiring bases in Syria, as it did in Libya, Somalia, and Qatar, is alarming Arab countries as well as Israel. Undoubtedly, the anxiety caused by Syria in the region cannot be compared to other geographies. Turkey is already inside, and there is no authority that says or can say 'get out'. The issue of bases will raise more questions. For now, we are watching the heart palpitations caused by early warnings.

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Another issue on which the strategic equation will be built is the determination of maritime jurisdiction. Ankara had signed a maritime jurisdiction agreement with the government in Tripoli against the government in Tobruk and the House of Representatives without waiting for the formation of a unified administration in Libya. This was done in the name of disrupting the game in the Eastern Mediterranean. However, Egypt and Greece had exposed Turkey with a partial maritime jurisdiction sharing agreement. Since Erdoğan could not get any results from that game, he had normalized relations with Egypt and Israel, and also accepting the situation on the EU side.

Now the players in the Eastern Mediterranean, especially Southern Cyprus and Greece, are on tenterhooks in case Turkey makes a deal with the HTS administration or a transitional government. The fact that Kaja Kallas, the EU High Representative of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, said that she had received assurances from Hakan Fidan that this would not happen shows that concern has spread to Brussels as well. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, and Greek Cypriot leader Nikos Christodoulides held a trilateral summit in Cairo. The decision was to reject any Turkish attempt to sign an agreement until an internationally recognized government is in place in Syria. Meanwhile, during Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati's visit to Damascus, the determination of maritime borders was discussed as a priority. In this respect, the movie in the Eastern Mediterranean is rewinding with Syria.

In addition, enthusiastic proponents of the idea of connecting Qatari gas to Turkey via Syria to heat Europe are also eagerly waiting. For many reasons, the excitement that is not felt in Qatar is felt in Turkey.

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But is there a consolidation of power that justifies such alarm about strategic calculations?

Yes, Erdoğan was portrayed as the victor of Assad's fall. But others are shooting the sequels. Or let's say there is an explosion in the number of directors. The story of the absolute decisive actor in Damascus is frothing. Julani and his team realize that the year will not turn in one season. HTS Foreign Minister Asaad Hassan al-Shaybani arrived in Turkey yesterday after touring Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Jordan. HTS's defense minister and Mukhabarat chief were with him. They are touring in threes. The opposition in Turkey is sarcastic: “Fidan was the first minister to visit Damascus, but Sheibani didn't even make his first visit to Turkey”. Is the order of prioritization Julani's preference or is it a strategy they had discussed with Fidan beforehand? First of all, Ankara cannot afford to worry about the order. It cannot be decisive in Syria on its own. Such an ambition would lead to the reality of a besieged and isolated Syria that the international community does not recognize, does not extend a helping hand, and does not remove it from sanctions and blacklists, and Turkey would be the biggest loser. Moreover, it would be in Ankara's interest for Shaybani to first go to the source of the money, get visas from the leaders of the Arab world, and turn this support into a reference at the door of the West. Of course, the conditions brought about by contacts with the Gulf and Western countries limit Turkey's capacity to steer.

A lot of fighting will determine who will be decisive in Damascus. There has been no promised national conference, no transitional government, no constitutional drafting, no elections. It is not clear what the system will be. Julani's promises may not see tomorrow either. This includes a commitment to eliminate the SDF.

We need to look at the future of Syria knowing that even the agreements made with the UN-recognized government in Libya have not yet gained legal validity.

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In fact, shaping Syria requires more than having a government that will write checks to Turkish contractors and having Turkish-speaking cadres. When HTS was in Idlib, it was dependent on Turkey. Now that it controls Damascus, its options have multiplied. And it also has to nod in all directions to overcome the obstacles of its own abysmal record.

The Turkish Foreign Ministry dressing Julani and his team from Vakko and trying to teach them diplomacy may save the rookies' image in the People's Palace. But the geopolitical calculations behind the dirty interventions in Syria in 2011 appear before the newcomers in new versions. The calculations also bring the showdowns to the stage. For Ankara, “being in Damascus” means dealing with all of them.

December 10, 2024 The end of an era