Is Öcalan’s letter in the picture in Syria?

While the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy (DEM) Party is waiting for a “call of the century” and a “road map” from İmralı Island, three letters were delivered to the cadres in Qandil, Syria and Europe in the haziest atmosphere possible. The content of Öcalan's letters is known only to his interlocutors, unknown to us.

However, Mazloum Abdi, the commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), who received the letter, took a step that gave the impression that he had lowered his sails against the HTS leadership. Could this new attitude be a direction that has evolved according to the signal given by the letter?

Although the HTS-SDF talks reached a consensus on basic principles, the process was stalled due to disagreements over the status, mechanisms, and timing of the merger. The recognition of Ahmed al-Sharaa, former ISIS/Qaeda leader Abu Mohammed al-Julani, as the 'interim president' by SDF-supporting countries, Turkey's efforts to invalidate the 'war on terror' card by forming a quadrilateral coalition against ISIS with Iraq, Syria and Jordan, Trump's delayed decision on Syria and the new masters in Damascus' unfamiliarity with the idea of autonomy weakened the chances of the Democratic Autonomous Administration for North and East Syria. Some of Mazloum Abdi's proposals to soften the situation did not change it.

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On Feb. 17, Abdi told North Press that he congratulated Julani as Syria's new 'president' and invited him to the east of the Euphrates to witness the reality of the region.

Abdi also listed HTS's expectations from them: The expulsion of non-Syrian fighters from SDF ranks; the release of ISIS detainees into government custody; and the return of government institutions to northeastern Syria.

“We are open to a national solution that would unite all Syrians,” he concluded his statement.

Here Julani is recognized in advance without seeing the guarantees in the status bargain. It is a gesture, but at the same time a waiver of the most important card on the table. When Julani was declared president at the Victory Conference in Damascus, attended by 18 organizations, the SDF did not recognize the decision.

Then, when the preparatory committee for the national dialogue conference was formed, no Kurdish representatives from the autonomous administration or from outside were included. In response, Salih Muslim, a member of the PYD Presidential Council, said that if the SDF, the Syrian Democratic Assembly (SDM) and other organs of the autonomous administration were not fairly represented at the national conference, the decisions taken would not bind them.

The fact that three of the seven members of the committee came directly from HTS was a clear indication of Julani's monopolization of the process. The first statement by committee spokesperson Hassan al-Daghim was also disappointing:

“Armed groups, including the Kurdish SDF, will not participate in the conference unless they surrender their weapons and custody and are integrated into the Ministry of Defense. The SDF does not represent the Kurds and the Syrians in the northeast of the country are represented by the people of these provinces. No one in Syria can impose privileges or seize a piece of the homeland.”

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In this atmosphere, another step was taken on Feb. 17, confirming Abdi's “President Sharaa” initiative. Officials from the SDF, the SDM, and the autonomous administration held a meeting at the al-Wazir base in the Hasakah countryside. Abu Omar al-Idlibi, commander of the SDF's Northern Democratic Brigade, announced the decisions taken. Later, the autonomous administration also confirmed the decisions without elaborating further.

According to Idlibi, it was decided that all non-Syrian fighters would leave the ranks of the SDF and leave northeastern Syria.

Abdi had previously mentioned that PKK-linked cadres could be sent. Since Ankara has pinned all its intervention moves here, it is important to remove this justification.

Of course, it is somehow inconspicuous that the foreign jihadist leaders on the wanted list have been placed in the new Syrian army with senior ranks and that other foreign militias have been granted citizenship!

The second decision is to incorporate the SDF and its security institutions into the Syrian army.

This is a decision in principle. It does not bring a new opening. The HTS leadership wants the SDF to dissolve itself and its soldiers to join the army individually. Integration as a bloc, that is, while preserving its autonomous character, is a red line for Damascus. The SDF will join, but how? Is there a formula between block participation and individual participation? Will Abdi be given a prominent seat in the general staff or the defense ministry, and will the SDF be reduced to a local security force in Kurdish-majority areas? There are no answers to these questions.

The third decision is to reactivate state institutions in northeast Syria.

If institutions are to be devolved, will autonomous governance come to an end? Will decentralization of authority to localities with a decentralized approach be deemed sufficient? I think this will continue to be a subject of negotiations.

The other decisions are to increase coordination with Damascus, facilitate the return of displaced people to their homes, establish joint committees to implement the decisions, congratulate Julani and invite him to northeast Syria.

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There is no reaction from HTS yet. “We are not in favor of a military solution,” HTS Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra said in his last statement.

At the moment, the HTS is in a good position. Julani also received invitations from Paris and Moscow. Of course, these contacts have binding effects as well as legitimacy. At the moment, this effect requires ruling out a military solution east of the Euphrates. With Ankara's support, HTS is also trying to warm up with the US and cut the SDF's support with offers such as taking over the fight against ISIS.

Diplomatic doors opened faster than expected. HTS's foreign minister, Asaad Hassan al-Shaibani, was the center of attention at the Munich Security Conference, posing as a friend with five American senators, staunch supporters of Israel.

The US-led international coalition is also supporting the talks between the two sides. However, the coalition members do not exert a noticeable weight in the negotiations beyond their position preventing military operations east of the Euphrates. This is where the Turkish factor comes into play. If there is to be a weight in favor of the SDF, the equation is that Turkey should also be in Damascus' weight basket.

I think the east of the Euphrates will continue to be a pending situation until Trump announces his final decision. Unless the roadmap coming out of İmralı Island is an ice-breaker...

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Riches that will escalate the battle for dominance over the region will provoke conflict unless there is a peaceful solution.

On a Syrian scale, we are not talking about little. The SDF controls the carbohydrate fields of Rmelan in the north of Hasakah, Jabsa in the south, and al-Omar, Tanak, Jaffrah, and Koniko in the Deir ez-Zor countryside. The Süveydiye, Jabsa and Koniko gas fields also supply power plants. The SDF-controlled Euphrates, Tabqa and Tishrin dams supply more than a quarter of Syria with drinking water, irrigation, and electricity. East of the Euphrates is Syria's granary with an 80 percent share in wheat, barley, and cotton production. In other words, the country's food, water, and energy security depends on this region. All this makes the SDF a target as much as it empowers it.

Of course, the provocative factor for the American forces to gain a place through the YPG/SDF was the advantage of the strategic basin. Logically, the Americans would not want to give up the SDF and the riches in the region until the kind of regime they want takes shape in Damascus. It remains to be seen how decisive these will be in Trump's parameters. Still, delaying the decision is about preserving strategic leverage. If the decision is to withdraw troops, there will be turbulence. Obviously, the Syria policy will not be announced until the picture in Damascus is clear.

The SDF's February 17 initiative could also be attributed to the aims to emphasize a negotiated solution until Trump makes his decision, to reduce Ankara's pressure on Damascus, to fend off a possible Turkish military intervention, to preserve the de-escalation agreement with HTS on the Euphrates line, and to buy time for Western backers trying to encircle Colani. This initiative could be in line with Öcalan's letter, but it could also be driven by American-French manipulation.