Syria's share in new Bahçeli-Erdoğan paradigm

Syria and the whole region are in ambiguous chaos. Abu Mohammad al-Julani, the leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), is trying to establish his own Salafist regime in Syria. Many of Julani’s legitimizers hope that the HTS leadership will transform into a broadly inclusive government in March, start drafting a constitution, and complete the transition through democratic elections. Julani, on the other hand, has not only shown that he is focused on establishing his own regime with his cabinet members and appointed governors, but in an interview with Al-Arabiya, he gave a roadmap: “It may take three years to draft a new constitution and four years to organize elections.”

By that time, the HTS regime will have taken shape, been implanted, and will have become entrenched.

What is the future now? Salafist-jihadist cadres are taking the helm in the new Syria. Above all, the Baathist mukhabarat is leaving and the al-Qaedaist mukhabarat is coming. The regime takes its shape without waiting for the constitution. For example, Julani made Anas Khattab, who uses the code name Abu Ahmad Hudud, the Syrian General Intelligence Director. This is not an ordinary name. Anas Khattab fought for al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq in Iraq. In 2012, he was among the founders of al-Nusra Front, the Syrian affiliate of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Julani’s comrade and black box. He is ruthless. He laid the foundation for HTS intelligence in Idlib, eliminated the opposition, and made Julani unrivaled. He announced that all intelligence agencies would be rebuilt from scratch. The HTS regime could bring serious divisions and conflicts.

On the other side, we are discussing the fate of an organization diametrically opposed to the emerging HTS regime. The discussions on the east of the Euphrates are based on the goal of integrating the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into the new order. The Kurds were proposing a secular democratic autonomy model centered on women with a co-presidential system and quotas as a solution for the whole of Syria. If the issue is to abandon all its claims and tie this structure to the main source of power of the HTS regime, this step would mean a solution tantamount to suicide. Taking it into the HTS regime while preserving some aspects of autonomy could also lead to blood incompatibility. Of course, if another Syria miraculously emerges, the context changes.

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Turkey's negotiations with the US, its efforts to condition HTS, its attempts to squeeze the SDF through different Kurdish channels, and its attempts to bring Abdullah Öcalan into the picture all converge on a single goal: The expulsion of PKK cadres from Syria, the disbandment of the SDF and the closing of the road to autonomy. In other words, complete liquidation.

During this process, SDF General Commander Mazloum Abdi made some proposals to stop Operation Dawn of Freedom, which targeted Kobane east of the Euphrates after Tel Rifaat and Manbij, and to achieve a permanent ceasefire. He suggested that Kobane be demilitarized. Then he said that foreign fighters, including PKK cadres, could leave Syria. Then he said they could leave the border crossings to the government in Damascus.

He emphasized that they are in favor of the unity and integrity of Syria and that they do not pursue federalism. He noted that the SDF could become a part of the Syrian army through a negotiated compromise. He listed the demands that would pave the way for this as follows: A decentralized system based on the principles of democratic pluralism in Syria, devolution of authority from the center to local councils, and a constitution that guarantees the rights of Kurds and other minorities. There was also support from Qandil for the proposed withdrawal of PKK cadres. Duran Kalkan said, “If there are non-Syrian Kurds and they decide to leave, they will leave. There is no problem for us.”

This was not enough to stop the attacks on the Euphrates line. But Turkey's military solution strategy has also stalled.

Three main factors have led the operation east of the Euphrates to a deadlock:

 - The US put the brakes on Ankara. Threats of sanctions prevented Turkey from developing ground operations other than air operations.

- The SDF withdrew from Manbij and made the Karakozak Bridge and the Tishrin Dam impassable.

 - The motivation of the Syrian National Army, which Turkey uses as a ground component, started to dissipate. While everyone was returning to their own regions after the fall of the regime or trying to grab a share of the new Syria in Damascus, they were stuck on the Euphrates line.

These difficulties brought about a new assessment. The east of the Euphrates was handed over to HTS. It was said that Turkey would step in if the new Syrian administration had difficulties in eliminating the SDF.

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There is no guarantee of a result this way either. Because other dilemmas come into play. The American deterrence against military action also applies to the new Syrian administration. Ankara expects Damascus to take action, which it cannot do with American forces on the ground. Moreover, it is not only Ankara that has a say in Damascus. Other actors, notably the United States, are also pressuring Julani. The American administration needs control mechanisms in Damascus.

In this possible scenario, we can envision a formula to absorb Turkey's tensions with the Kurds.

In a joint press conference with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Julani emphasized that they do not want any armed forces outside the state, but did not mention the use of force. Of course, Julani prefers a Syria without the SDF. Moreover, the social contract adopted by the de facto autonomous administration does not match the plan that HTS aims to put on Syria. He also wants to eliminate the model east of the Euphrates. Its heart is in favor of Turkey's liquidation plan. But the American side also expects the SDF to be integrated into the system in a state of de-conflict.

In the face of this deadlock, Julani can display a pragmatism that says to the Turkish and American representatives, “First you agree among yourselves, find a middle ground, and I will accept the outcome.”

When Fidan returned from Damascus, he was in the mood of “this is done”. But Julani’s statement to the Al-Arabiya channel showed that a non-conflict solution is a priority. “Negotiations are ongoing with the SDF to resolve the crisis in northeastern Syria,” he said. He emphasized that the Kurds are an integral part of Syria. “There will be no division of Syria in any way,” he said. He noted that Syria will not allow itself to become a launching pad for the PKK.

Integration is a positive but undefined term. HTS and the Fateh al-Mubin coalition, led by HTS, aim to form the new Syrian army with all armed groups, including the components of the Syrian National Army and organizations in the south. Mazloum Abdi says that the SDF can become part of the Syrian army while maintaining some of its characteristics, i.e. partial autonomy. Julani did not specify whether the integration would be with or without status, but we assume that this will be left to negotiations between Turkey and the US.

The US State Department met with Julani. He had positive impressions. But until a government in Damascus takes shape according to its priorities, it does not want to reward it too much. For one thing, they have extended the sanctions against Syria until 2029. They have also increased the number of American troops from 900 to 2000. It seems that the US will not leave Damascus on its own.

Israel's attitude is also aimed at influencing Washington. Foreign Minister Gideon Saar said: “The new regime in Syria is a terrorist gang... The situation in Syria is not reassuring. There are clashes in coastal towns, there are open threats by Erdoğan to eliminate Kurdish autonomy, there is harassment of Christians, and this is an Islamist regime that wants to control all of Syria.” After contributing magnificently to the overthrow of Assad and destroying Syria's entire military presence, Israel is now playing on the country's ethnic and sectarian fault lines. Of course, its main concern is not minorities, although it touches the truth. It wants a neighbor that is desperate, fragile, and open to intervention. It is trying to open channels it can exploit. We can say that the American position is limiting Turkey and Israel is provoking it.

Moreover, while Ankara is trying to render the SDF helpless, the US and France are trying to unite Kurdish parties and send a joint delegation to Damascus. In other words, this is a move that elevates the issue from the PYD-YPG, Turkey's target, to the Kurdish problem. When Kurdish mullahs are involved in this, the situation changes a bit. Sheikh Murshid Haznawi stepped in to ensure unity among Kurdish parties. Then the Kurdistan Islamic Movement on the Iraqi side developed an initiative. The Damascus offices of the movement, which were closed in 2011, were reopened in order to ensure reconciliation among Kurds in Rojava and to develop a dialog with HTS. This means opening a channel for Rojava to talk to HTS in Islamic terms. These initiatives can be opened to two sides, depending on where they are taken from: One, the partnership of the Kurdish parties can be used to cross Turkey's red line on the PYD. Second, Turkey can look at the positive side and turn this into a maneuvering space for a solution with the Kurds.

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The Öcalan initiative, spearheaded by MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, was based on the fear that the maps in the Middle East might change due to Israeli attacks and that Turkey would be caught unprepared in Syria. The unexpected rapid collapse in Syria gave Turkey the opportunity to clean up the field without a serious opening, but due to the factors I have just listed, it could not follow through.

I think the reason for the renewed urgency of the Öcalan initiative was that the new equation on the ground did not guarantee the desired outcome. Öcalan's message to the DEM Party delegation, like the previous ones, calls for 'Turkish protection' for Syrian Kurds. Without knowing the content of the speeches, we are writing and drawing a bit too much.

Öcalan has a great influence on the Kurds in Rojava. If Ankara sees the talks in İmralı as a mission to pull the plug on Öcalan's hand, this path points to a dead end. The call to say goodbye to weapons at the risk of being wiped out may also wipe out Öcalan in his own sphere of influence. If the state relies on Öcalan's influence, such an outcome may not be strategically desirable. The main goal is for the PKK to lay down its arms. But what does the Syrian side of the talks tell us? Because there is a situation there that goes beyond the PKK. First of all, the US is the main supplier and supporter of the SDF. Could a flexible decentralized solution, with official status for the Kurdish identity and language, as well as a flexible decentralization solution, be an intermediate solution? Here the phone goes silent, so to speak! Turkey's unresolved Kurdish issue has become a fundamental problem regarding the system to be established in Syria. In a sense, the fate of Syria is also being discussed in Turkey!

Öcalan's call for strengthening the Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood, for all political parties to make a positive contribution, and for the Turkish Grand National Assembly to be the main ground for this, points to the space that needs to be opened for Kurdish expectations in return for the dissolution of the PKK.

He states that he is ready to make a positive contribution to the new paradigm supported by Bahçeli and Erdoğan.

If the paradigm on the government side is indexed to the dissolution of the PKK, which it is, Öcalan's contribution to this requires a response. We do not know what was discussed between the state and Öcalan regarding the legal basis for the Kurdish-Turkish brotherhood. Since the main trigger for the Öcalan initiative was Syria, I am on this side of the issue.

In this new dialog, we see Öcalan buying the state's fears about the US and Israeli approach to the Kurds. “The events in Gaza and Syria have revealed the insolubility of problems deepened by foreign interventions,” Öcalan says. The US partnership with the SDF and Israel's approach to the Kurds highlight the need to remove the Kurdish issue as a justification for foreign intervention. Öcalan recognizes the state's fear and is trying to turn it into a catalyst for a solution. However, this approach does not necessarily mean that he is saying “yes” to a gratuitous termination or reset.

Öcalan's actual call depends on both the legal arrangements at home and the conditions affecting Syria maturing a bit. For one thing, both sides are waiting for the new American position with Donald Trump. The Kurds may also want to see what comes out of the negotiations with HTS and what their place will be in the new government that will be formed in March.