The end of an era

For nearly 14 years, Syria, shaped by armed rebellion, proxy wars, foreign interventions, and occupations, has now been left in the hands of a version transformed by ISIS's "moderation" potion in just 12 days.

On the night before last, following the Syrian army's withdrawal from Homs, Damascus fell under the control of forces led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) within hours. The keys to the capital were handed over to the jihadist coalition on a golden platter without a single shot being fired.

According to a statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, following negotiations, gave instructions for a peaceful transfer of power, resigned, and left the country. Kremlin sources report that Assad and his family fled to Moscow and have been granted political asylum.

In line with the agreement shaped during the turning point in Homs, Prime Minister Ghazi Jalali was taken from his home by armed men and escorted to a hotel to hand over authority. A complete transfer of power is underway.

For now, the new master of Damascus is Abu Muhammad al-Jolani. Having emerged as ISIS’s emir in Syria, he broke away from his origins, pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda, and transformed the Nusra Front into HTS, adopting the guise of a “moderate jihadist.” He is now steering Syria’s future. His first act was to visit the Umayyad Mosque, a site that has long been part of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s dreams. The second act of this play has just begun. We can’t predict who else the Umayyad Mosque will witness!

Though he is deemed a terrorist in the United States with a $10 million bounty on his head, “changing his cloak” and eliminating Israel’s most significant enemy and its allies have elevated Jolani to the rank of a “reasonable” opposition figure. We wonder what kind of order Western powers, who have preemptively extended him credit, will establish with him.

With Russia and Iran withdrawing from the stage, the decisive moves shaping Syria’s future will now come from the powers backing the armed groups. Of course, given its position on the UN Security Council and the bases it maintains in Syria, Russia will still remain involved—but it will likely focus more on dimensions that directly concern its own interests.

It seems that those negotiating with HTS tried to avoid repeating the American example of dissolving the state after the occupation of Iraq. They appeared to avoid a path that would disrupt Syria’s institutional integrity, apart from the army, intelligence agencies, and the Ba’ath Party, which define the regime itself. The assignment of the transfer of power to the prime minister, the continuation of diplomatic missions abroad, and the prohibition of armed groups from entering public buildings during this process point to this approach. Even though they allowed the looting of the Central Bank, they are not completely dismantling the state. This is the image of the first day—we cannot know what tomorrow holds!

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Even though everyone asks what will happen next, the question of "How did it happen?" remains. When we go back to the point where the collapse began, we understand that the decision for withdrawal—sometimes without conflict, sometimes with measured strikes—was made in Aleppo. Clearly, there was no desire to shed more blood or destroy cities once again for a war that could not be won. And so, a gradual surrender was decided. But what forced Assad into this?

In Idlib, a jihadist army—trained and equipped for ten years, supported in establishing drone battalions, focused on its goals, and devoted to its cause—was brought to face an army that, over 13 years, had become worn out, exhausted, unable to replenish its arsenal, and had lost its motivation.

In a country whose economy was driven into collapse by the U.S.’s Caesar Act and the European Union’s sanctions, where rebuilding was out of reach and even daily survival solutions were lacking, and whose people were left breathless, everyone reached the point of saying, "Whatever happens, let it happen now." In other words, the survival of the Assad regime and the survival of the country had become mutually exclusive.

Assad was pressured by the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan on one side, and by Russia on the other, to stay away from a war with Israel. He lent an ear to the tempting offers suggesting that if he distanced himself from Iran and cut off supply routes to Hezbollah, he could find a path to safety.

Assad giving the impression of playing a double game damaged the trust between him and Iran. Suspicions that intelligence regarding Iranian targets in Syria was being leaked to Israel from within further eroded their partnership. However, Assad's composed strategy in the face of regional conflict did not prevent his downfall.

The support lines that could have saved Assad were also weakened. Iran suffered devastating blows from Israeli attacks inside Syria. Coming to Syria's aid now effectively meant becoming a direct target for Israel.

Hezbollah, which had secured the Lebanon-Syria lines during the 2013 Battle of Qusayr and played a key role in urban warfare, also suffered heavy losses. Moreover, Israel’s violations of the ceasefire after November 27 prevented Hezbollah from leaving its positions in Lebanon. Iran's efforts to mobilize militias from Iraq were also thwarted due to U.S. threats against Baghdad.

By targeting Syria’s critical military facilities, Israel cleared the field of obstacles for HTS. Yesterday, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu boasted about Israel’s role in the process. He said,“A historic day. This is the result of Israel's attacks on Iran and Hezbollah.”

The primary blow that clipped Assad’s wings may have come from Russia. It’s an undeniable fact that the focus shifted due to the war in Ukraine. However, Russian President Vladimir Putin was angry with Assad. He had expected a reorganization of institutional structures, particularly in the military, but it didn’t happen. The Syrian government’s incompetence in economic management also tested Putin’s patience.

Many parties blamed Assad’s stalling tactics for the deadlock in the constitutional committee talks in Geneva. Assad, thinking the situation was sustainable as long as Russia stood by him, ignored Putin’s recommendations. Additionally, he relied too heavily on a strategy of balancing Russia against Iran and vice versa. As a last resort, Putin pushed for Turkey-Syria normalization. Assad’s failure to show the necessary flexibility left Putin in a difficult position.

More importantly, the inability to protect Aleppo—rescued through extensive military operations, diplomatic efforts, and financial contributions—may have led Putin to effectively say, “Do as you will.” After Assad’s meeting with Putin in the Kremlin, Russia gave no indication that it would repeat its 2015 mobilization. The Russian military only carried out airstrikes on rear positions. Its failure to target convoys advancing toward Hama and Homs raised suspicion.

In my personal opinion, Assad returned from Moscow in despair. He realized he had reached the end of the road.

Meanwhile, on the Iranian and Iraqi fronts, questions arose about the point of engaging in a war where the Syrian army wasn’t truly fighting and was only making more enemies.

The perception that Iran and Russia could reverse the course at the Homs turning point was unrealistic. The situation was far different from the pre-2017 scenario where cities were split in two. Any intervention to reverse the situation would have been extremely bloody and destructive. Both Iran and Russia sought ways to adapt to the new process with minimal losses.

Notably, the fact that HTS refrained from directing its operations toward Latakia and Tartus gave the impression of an agreement.

Those who had placed their hopes on Assad now find themselves face-to-face with forces they had once called “executioners.” From here on, survival instincts will take over: fleeing to escape, or pretending to celebrate the so-called “revolution” while cursing Assad behind his back!

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The developments not only bring geopolitical fractures but also fuel the internal struggle to establish a new order, one that is doomed to disorder.

The collapse of the Assad regime signifies the removal of a barrier to the Middle East order designed to safeguard Israel. The biggest beneficiary of this has been Israel.

Russia’s Eastern Mediterranean policy, centered on Syria, has hit a wall. The perception of being a power incapable of protecting its ally will spark debates about Russian reliability in the countries where it has recently secured footholds in Africa.

Iran has suffered its greatest blow in the geopolitical game it sought to build through the Axis of Resistance. It may need to retreat inward for a while. Although Iran won’t easily withdraw from the geopolitical game, after the debacle in Syria, it may allocate more energy and resources to strengthening its internal front. With the Syrian chapter closed, Tehran might gain some maneuvering room to prepare for the maximum pressure campaign promised by American president-elect Donald Trump. If it limits nuclear enrichment and maintains its commitment to full cooperation with the United Nations, it may avoid becoming the "next country" to be crushed.

Hezbollah’s urgently needed supply routes for reinforcement have been cut off. Until new supply lines are established, Hezbollah’s position against Israel will become even more vulnerable. However, this doesn’t mean the resistance has been defeated. Even in besieged Gaza, the resistance hasn’t been extinguished.

Obviously, Palestine’s isolation has deepened after the ceasefire in Lebanon and the changes in Syria.

We can also foresee that efforts will intensify to disband the Hashd al-Shaabi forces in Iraq, following Syria. Multifaceted moves to undermine Iran’s influence in Iraq are likely to increase. This will be followed by operations aimed at dismantling Ansarullah in Yemen.

Despite being bogged down along Lebanon’s borders, the genocidal state of Israel has reaped the greatest reward in Syria, taking advantage of the masses of jihadists there. In the first hours of the collapse, Israel began expanding its occupation in the Golan Heights. It entered the demilitarized zones of Quneitra and is attempting to seize the Syrian side of Mount Hermon (Jabal al-Sheikh), a key water source. For Israel, this is the perfect opportunity. Additionally, yesterday it bombed critical Syrian military facilities and a research center in various regions.

Tayyip Erdoğan, fulfilling his role as a co-chair of the Middle East project to perfection, deserves a significant medal! However, this trajectory could turn Syria into Afghanistan and Turkey into Pakistan. A Syria dominated by HTS will also become a magnet for global jihadist networks, just like in Idlib.

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What will Syria look like in the hands of these groups? What kind of order will be established? How will actors with vastly different worldviews, interests, and external ties come together for a shared future? Even Islamist forces have suffered thousands of casualties in the past infighting.

HTS may emerge as a center of gravity for other groups as the organization leading the process. However, there are still many groups that won’t align under this umbrella. While Jolani’s “moderation” makeover hasn’t even been fully embraced within his organization, there are also a dozen foreign jihadist groups aligned with Al-Qaeda under his command.

Yes, the current slogan is “inclusivity” and forming a governing committee according to the will of the people. Pragmatism may work until the bridge is crossed. Furthermore, Jolani must overcome barriers like isolation and sanctions. To achieve this, he will avoid disrupting the Western-promoted image that he has “changed” and is “appealing to everyone.” However, this perception alone will not suffice. Even with a watered-down version of a sharia-based vision for Syria’s future, many groups will find it impossible to fit into this framework. Herein lies a massive potential for conflict. Syria was one of the rare Arab countries that had internalized secularism.

More importantly, the Kurds must also be part of this new order. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which control 40 percent of the country, propose a model fundamentally opposed to that of HTS. How will they keep the actors east of the Euphrates River within the unity of Syria? Through an inclusive coalition that makes the Kurds a founding actor in power in Damascus, or with a federal solution? Are there different plans for Sweida, where the Druze live, or the coastal strip where Alawites are concentrated? HTS and its allies don’t come from an understanding inclined toward federalist approaches. Moreover, the Syrian National Army (SNA), which would likely be on the other side of the table, is an outright enemy of the SDF.

The SDF has three key bargaining chips: U.S. support, a disciplined army, and control over the country’s oil, natural gas, and grain resources. Holding the country’s economic wealth is a strong card, but it’s also a cause for war. For the new rulers of Damascus, the eastern Euphrates will undoubtedly be a target they must reach.

From the American perspective, a significant opportunity has emerged to shape Syria. The most important tool at their disposal for this mission is the SDF. Trump’s tweet, “This is not our war. Stay out of it,” does not mean the U.S. will withdraw from Syria simply because Assad is gone. The Pentagon has announced it will remain in Syria to defeat ISIS. While the ISIS threat is real, derivatives of ISIS have already seized power. Yet the Americans continue repeating the stale justification. It’s a cold parody.

On the other hand, HTS will have to explore ways to work with the SDF to secure American support and approval. However, it could also take steps to weaken the SDF. The tribal card is shifting from Assad’s hand to Jolani’s. Arabs within the SDF may see themselves as closer to the new actors in Damascus. Let’s not forget that in the past, the region’s tribes first supported the Free Syrian Army, then ISIS, and later, under Saudi-American influence, aligned with the SDF.

A third party enters the scene here. Unlike the U.S., Turkey, which HTS has relied on, been fed by, and benefited from for years, aims to sideline the SDF. Beyond the contrasting models they propose, how will this be achieved given the need to balance two conflicting factors? Currently, Turkey is trying to control Manbij through the SNA. Even on the day Assad left, gunfire in Manbij didn’t stop. In other words, Assad is gone, but Ankara’s game plan hasn’t changed. Ankara will continue using the SNA and try to pressure HTS. However, HTS has begun distancing itself from dependence on Turkey and has started engaging with other actors and borders.

Not all of the Syrian opposition is Islamist. Furthermore, the inclusivity HTS promises must also encompass the parties and groups that operated under the shadow of the departing regime.

Can all these groups sit around the table in Damascus and reach an internal resolution? Armed groups could start by dissolving themselves. But that would be to expect a miracle! HTS established its dominance in Idlib not by being inclusive but by eliminating everyone outside its ranks. Of course, ruling all of Syria requires a different strategy. Even among themselves, agreement is difficult. There are too many guns in the room. If not today, conflict will inevitably erupt tomorrow.

International actors will not leave Syria to its own devices either. A table could be set up, like in Geneva. At that point, every actor will fight to steer the process in their own direction—just like in Libya. Initially, a national transitional council was established in Libya, and this was considered a success. But at the outset, all the groups were looking in the same direction. The situation in Syria is different. Everyone has fought against one another. Everyone has blood on their hands. Syria’s contradictions are immense.

Trump’s priority is also Israel’s security. Until the newcomers provide these assurances, the U.S. will continue to use its presence and power in the region. The Taliban model, which Western powers spent years trying to destroy in Afghanistan but failed, is now being imported into Syria. This time, Western powers are playing the game in a region much closer to home. Both Israel and Turkey, who seem satisfied with this outcome, will have much to reconsider.