Turkey fails to recognize Kurds as Middle East reality, academic Bozarslan says

As the world was preparing for Trump's second term, he started announcing names for his new cabinet. The names announced and the policies they pursue have created an air of cautious pessimism at the global level. The Middle East is one of the leading regions watching these steps. 

What Trump, who will inherit an atmosphere of uncertainty and conflict, will do is the main determinant of the daily and future politics of regional actors. Turkey is one of the countries trying to create a roadmap in this framework, and the Kurds are likely to be the main determinant of this scenario.

What kind of bloc does Trump and his cabinet represent for the US? What does the dominant bloc shaping Israeli politics have in mind? What kind of uncertainty would an Israeli-Iranian conflict leave for the world and the region? Will the US hand Syria over to Russia? Where does the Kurdish issue stand in Turkey's foreign policy? Are MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli's outbursts an invitation to form a new hegemonic bloc? Why is the government's strategy not clear? Will a counter-hegemony emerge from the traffic between the opposition CHP and the DEM Party?

We asked these questions to Professor Hamit Bozarslan, a Middle East expert and a professor at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales.

According to Bozarslan, there is already a polyarchy within the ruling party in Turkey and there is enough internal conflict to prevent the formation of a transparent strategy for the Kurdish issue. The opposition, on the other hand, can only establish a counter-hegemony if the CHP creates a program of democratization and acceptance of the legitimacy of the Kurds and comes to terms with its past.

Below is the full translation of Bozarslan’s interview.

We will see Trump back in the White House for his second term. He has also started to announce the members of his cabinet. What kind of an era are we expecting? What does the bloc he represents tell us?

Trump's re-election is certainly a very important development. As for the bloc he has created, Pierre Bourdieu used to talk about the transition between capitals, that is, the transitivity and complementarity between economic and cultural capital. However, what we are seeing now is a phenomenon of capital rupture rather than a transition. Those who are defined as elite, which includes women, immigrants, democratic layers, universities, and layers with cultural capital, including some minorities, are now seen as an enemy. The new bloc that has come to power has actually intensified since the 2000s, let's not forget the Tea Party. This bloc has this characteristic: It has a structure that can bring together both the very rich and the poor segments of society. It does not define itself as a hegemonic bloc, but at the same time, it expresses that it represents the real and only America, the only American culture. What is happening in America is very important in this respect. The question is being asked whether a war cabinet is being formed in America. I think the answer to that right now is that there seems to be a war cabinet in America against American culture.

So there will be a war/conflict, but not internationally?

Yes, we are likely to see a war/conflict, but it will be internal. There is no civil war at the moment, but Trump has made no secret of his desire for this confrontation. Similarly, Steve Bannon, one of Trump's former advisors, who is a believer in conspiracy theories, says that the time has come for their power, this power is a war power. What Bannon actually means is that this government is not a war government for the outside, but a war government for the inside. The block has already been shaped accordingly.

In your analyses, you also use the concept of hegemonic bloc in the context of Israel. At this point, you even say that looking only at Netanyahu would be an incomplete assessment. Considering the concept of hegemonic bloc, what should we look at other than the government/Netanyahu to understand the current situation?

I think we need to look at the historical development. It is not easy to compare, but a country like the US has experienced the Obama era and the Biden era. These two periods were an important achievement for US democracy, regardless of its foreign policy. Israel also experienced such a period: The Yitzhak Rabin period, and the Oslo process period (1993-1995). We have seen that in such periods it is necessary to go very fast and impose peace as an irreversible stage. When you say 'let's protect our national security, let's protect our hegemony, and let's find a solution to the Palestinian problem', inevitably a lot of issues are left in limbo. This ambiguity contributes to the strengthening of the layers that oppose these projects. Time is a very important phenomenon. Gramsci was also aware of this, but not only Gramsci, Mussolini was also aware of this. In these situations one has to act quickly, the long-term time frame is not necessarily in favor of the pro-peacemakers.

To understand what is happening in Israel, we need to go back a little bit to the 1980s, because in the early 1980s, a hegemonic bloc was forming. Let's remember the Begin period, the Lebanon War, the Sabra and Shatila massacres, the expressions used against the Palestinians, and the relations between Israel and South Africa. In this period, there was a right-wing that was based more on Jewish nationalism. Religious movements had not yet become so strong. In the 2000s, these religious movements grew stronger and almost captured the Israeli right. The right, the Likud for example, underwent a change. Therefore, if we can look at the long term, Israel's politics today can be better understood.

What does this hegemonic bloc-oriented structure tell us about Iran and the Middle East in particular? In other words, we ask if Israel will attack Iran, this is a question. But what would such an attack leave behind? We saw an example of this in Iraq, what will be done with a similarly devastated Iran?

It is difficult to predict how far the attack on Iran will go, and to what extent Iran will respond. Netanyahu has a clear logic here, and as we have seen in Lebanon, this is the logic of the army: It is time to change the strategic balance in the Middle East and we have the power. This is not a logic that we are unfamiliar with. We heard it before the invasion of Iraq. George W. Bush, Paul Wolfowitz, and Donald Rumsfeld spoke along similar lines about Iraq, they said that we can change the existing balances.

This approach takes into account the existing balances but does not address dynamics that have not yet taken shape or emerged. We saw this clearly in Iraq, the Bush administration acted with an operational logic in Iraq. They thought like this: There are three structures/communities: Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds. The Sunnis are linked to the Baath, we must defeat them. The Shiites will support us in any case, the Kurds are already on our side. This was an approach that did not take into account the emerging dynamics. It didn't take into account that there could be an anti-American backlash among the Shiites, it didn't take into account Al-Qaeda. Therefore, even if Netanyahu speaks today in consideration of the existing dynamics, what kind of dynamics will emerge tomorrow, will new dynamics be added to the old dynamics, will sectarian dynamics lead to a new radicalism? We cannot answer these questions because these dynamics have not yet emerged.

I guess these unpredictable dynamics also apply to Iran?

Yes. The Iranian regime has been in a crisis for 20 years and the solution it has found is militia politics in the Middle East. Iran has no politics in the Middle East other than militia diplomacy. In Iran and Lebanon, there was an escalating revolutionary scenario in 2019. This revolutionary reaction in both countries showed that Shiite youth, and Shiite women no longer wanted to sacrifice themselves, no longer wanted to pay the price of Karbala, and wanted to move from object to subject, from subjects to citizens. Iran, Hezbollah, Hashd al-Shaabi were able to suppress this with the effect of the Covid pandemic. In other words, both in Iran and Lebanon, there are some Shiite-based dynamics against the regime. We do not know how these dynamics will develop tomorrow. Therefore, in my opinion, the strategy of both Netanyahu and the Iranian regime can lead to unpredictable scenarios. But there is another situation that is clear: Iran has been demanding negotiations with the US since October 7th.

Yes, Iran has met with the US through Musk, which supports what you are saying. I guess you are saying we can expect more.

Iran is saying this, and Trump has also made statements pointing to negotiations with Iran. He said, 'We need to end the era of war with Iran'. I think there is this logic here: International relations also has an approach that disregards human life and uses the capacity to harm human beings to the utmost. 'We can do a lot of damage to Iran, and Iran can do a lot of damage to us. But from that capacity to do harm, we can reach a compromise'. If Harris had been in power, this negotiation process would have been easier, but it is going to happen one way or the other. Iran is much weaker than it was on October 7th, both Hamas and Hezbollah have been hit very hard. They have not been defeated, because the meaning of war is not only military. National issues should be treated as national issues and political issues as political issues. In this respect, it is not possible to talk about a defeat or an Israeli victory. But militarily, it is clear that both organizations have suffered serious damage, which means that Iran has also been weakened. It is in these conditions that the negotiations will take place.

Russia is an important actor in the Middle East equation. With the Trump era, we may see some changes in terms of US policy in Ukraine. However, the relations between Russia and the US have the capacity and historical/political quality to affect the actors in the field such as Syria, Israel, Kurds, and Turkey. What will the Trump era and the relationship between Russia and the US tell us about the future of Syria?

While it is difficult to predict what Trump might do now, let’s remember this: In his first term, Trump pursued a policy that destroyed rationality. For example, John Bolton, one of Trump's national security advisors, who was in favor of attacking Iran, was soon removed from the picture. This shows that Trump may not necessarily follow a coherent strategy.

Trump's cabinet is much more powerful than his previous cabinet. Whether these powerful people will have a certain weight or not, we don't know at the moment. Because this decisive weight also means that the American establishment exists. But this establishment has been severely eroded in Trump's first term, so we will have to wait. But let's take into account that there is a conviction in the US, which is not unique to Trump, that 'the Syrian issue is not our issue, but we don't want the Kurds to be completely annihilated'. So they want a new Syria in which the Kurds are somehow reintegrated into the system.

If Russia plays an important role in this, there is a possibility that Syria will be handed over to Russia. I don't know how valid this is, but let's remember this: In 2013, when the Obama administration was preparing to bomb Syria from the air, Russia intervened. At that point, the United States, so to speak, left Syria to Russia. This model may come up again: In other words, handing Syria over to Russia on the condition that the Kurds are not completely exterminated and do not pose a threat to the US in any way. This is not an unreasonable scenario, but its contours are difficult to predict.

While these developments are taking place in the Middle East, what kind of a change will we see in the policies of Turkey, which has taken an active position in the Middle East for the last 15 years? Can we attribute the confusing moves towards the Kurdish question to a change in politics in the Middle East in this framework?

This is also difficult to predict. But let us remember the 1990s: Turkey's foreign policy was based entirely on the Kurds. It was based on the PKK presence in Lebanon and Syria on the one hand, and on trying to prevent the formation of a Kurdistan in Iraq on the other. Similarly in those years and after 2015, Turkey has not pursued a foreign policy based on anything other than the Kurds.

Between 2010-2013, Erdoğan, Davutoğlu and the forces aligned with him thought that Turkey would be a primus inter pares (first among equals) in the Middle East, that Turkey would be a role model and a determinant in the region, and some democratic forces also believed this. Indeed, the Obama administration also thought that Turkey could assume a leadership role in the Middle East as a democratic power. But after Kobane, after 2014, Turkey's foreign policy began to be shaped almost entirely in relation to Kurdish politics. Let us comment on Turkey's policy, but let us also recognize that rational reason has been destroyed here: We saw this lack of rationality in the shooting of the Russian plane, in the crises with the Gulf, in the crises with Egypt, in the policy pursued in Syria. In other words, Turkey spent ten years creating crises and the following years calming them down, and all that was left was Syria.

Turkey now sees that there is a Kurdish reality, but does not want to see that it is a reality in the Middle East, or wants to eliminate the Kurdish reality in the Middle East. The destructive policy towards Afrin is an example of this, and we need to go back in history. We see similar policies and reports from the 1930s: Preventing the Kurdification of the west of the Euphrates and de-Kurdification of the east of the Euphrates. In other words, to perceive the Kurds as a group that is constantly threatening, to think that Kurdishness is an entity that threatens Turkishness, and to eliminate the Kurdish phenomenon in the Middle East as much as possible. I think Kobane was an example in this respect, and Kobane took place at a time when the opening process was beginning in Turkey. So there is a complicated situation. What is going on in Turkey is not transparent, but if we take into account the history of the 20th century, we see that Turkey has not been able to overcome its anxieties, its gothic fears in this regard.

We talked about the hegemonic bloc in Israel. In almost every country, we actually see such a hegemony formation and the side actors that support it. If we look at the situation in Turkey, after 2015, the AKP government made a change within its own bloc, adding the MHP to its side and putting some of its former partners aside. Considering this context, do the Öcalan statements we hear today mostly through the MHP herald the construction of a new bloc?

Since we are not in a transparent environment, it is difficult to assess the government's strategy. Who makes up the government, how are the blocs within the government shaped, what are the breaking points, what are the expectations, what are the scenarios being developed? We cannot predict these.

In my previous analyses, I have spoken of a plot of mischief, and perhaps this is where we are now. In other words, there is a situation where there is a level of internal conflict that can prevent a scenario from being implemented, but it cannot continue in its current state. I don't know how long this will last, but it seems to me that there is no power within the government to determine a strategy right now, because there are different blocs and interests. So, in a sense, there is a polyarchy in Turkey, but there is also a principle of a chieftain. Will there be a red or green light? He decides, he sets the red line, but there is also an oligarchic or polycratic situation, which means that there are different layers.

This applies to the MHP and the nationalist community in general. How will these layers of nationalists behave tomorrow in the face of such a development? It is very difficult to predict this now. However, it is possible to say the following: There is certainly enough internal conflict within the government to prevent the formation of a transparent strategy.

While this is happening on the ruling front, there is a change in the policies of the opposition, especially the CHP, and we see this better in their different reactions to the local elections and the trustees appointed. For example, both Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu and CHP leader Özgür Özel went to Mardin and met with Ahmet Türk after the appointment of the trustees and raised their voices from there. We said hegemonic bloc, but can we say that there is an attempt to establish a counter-hegemony in the opposition, especially between CHP and DEM Party?

This will be determined by the CHP. For such a development to take place, the CHP needs to break with its centuries-old history, accept equality, recognize the legitimacy of the Kurdish issue and the legitimacy of democracy. It also needs to take this beyond rhetoric and put it into a program.

The CHP needs to come to terms with its past and determine what kind of Turkey it wants to see in the 2030-2040s. In this context, I think the Spanish model can be taken as a basis. How did Spain get out of authoritarianism? How did Spain democratize after the Franco regime? By recognizing that democracy is a foundation and that the Basque and Catalan issues are legitimate problems. So will the CHP be able to reach this stage? The problem is not only the granting of equal citizenship to Kurds, because anyone who does not embrace their Kurdishness is already an equal citizen in Turkey. The problem is already the acceptance of the legitimacy of Kurdishness, of being a Kurd, of being a Greek, of being an Armenian. This also means coming to terms with the past and opening the dark pages of the past. Will the CHP be able to do this? I hope so.