Two rival strategies for Kurds in new Syria

The fundamental contradiction emerges between the U.S. and Turkey. While the two countries' priorities align on managing the armed insurgency, dismantling Syria, and ensuring Israel's security, they diverge when it comes to integrating the SDF-YPG into the new order.

The main actors behind the dirty intervention in Syria achieved their goal through jihadist forces 13 years later. After Assad's departure, the war to reshape Syria began with the "destructive actor" Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).

As in 2011, the U.S. is trying once again to steer the process. Washington aims for a Syria loyal to the American order. The warning "New Syria must not threaten its neighbors" signals the priority of ensuring Israel's security. Americans are pleased with the result but uncertain about the future. Shaping the outcome requires significant leverage.

Ankara, as the country most closely involved with the powers in Damascus, asserts, "I am the leader of this process." The fact that the head of Turkey's National Intelligence Organization (MIT), İbrahim Kalın, drove to the Umayyad Mosque in a vehicle used by Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, who has a $10 million bounty placed on him by the U.S. government, sends the message to all sides that "the road to Damascus now goes through Ankara." What an intoxicating claim!

Israel is grateful to HTS for toppling the Baath regime, removing Iran, and cutting off Hezbollah's supply lines. However, by stripping the country bare, Israel seeks to assert its dominance upfront. It does so by not only occupying vast areas such as Mount Hermon, Quneitra, and the Damascus countryside but also by bombing all of Syria's bases, radars, arsenals, weapons production facilities, naval ships, jet and helicopter fleets, missile and air defense systems. This is what it means to be a mafia-like terrorist state!

HTS leader Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, now at the helm in Damascus, has stated that the justification of Iran and Hezbollah is no longer valid and declared, "We will not engage in conflict with Israel." He has even begun efforts to disarm Palestinian organizations in Syria. Yet, this has not been enough to halt Israel’s attacks.

Concerns from Arab countries, many of which were part of the destructive forces during the proxy war, are coming to the forefront. There is fear that the Muslim Brotherhood might reemerge in Egypt, radical Salafi groups could awaken and engulf Lebanon, political Islam could strengthen and reach the shores of the United Arab Emirates, ISIS could revive in Iraq’s Sunni triangle, and Islamist movements could stir unrest in Jordan. These fears whisper that the process must not be left solely in the hands of HTS.

Israel does not want jihadists useful in Syria to become destabilizing triggers in Jordan. Jordan is one of the cornerstones of Israel’s security architecture. According to Israel's state broadcaster KAN, Israel, concerned that the new situation in Syria could destabilize Jordan, sent Shin Bet Director Ronen Bar and Military Intelligence Director Shlomi Binder to Amman for secret talks on Friday.

On Saturday in Aqaba, the foreign ministers’ meeting of the Arab Contact Group addressed expectations and sensitivities regarding the desired outcome for Syria. Although the final statement did not serve as a roadmap, it emphasized certain principles. It supported a political transition process in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2254 and called for an end to all military operations. With this clause, Turkey implicitly allowed a critique of its actions. The statement addressed the rights of all components of the population, regardless of race, sect, or religion.

General sensitivities, such as the protection of state institutions, avoiding chaos in Syria, ensuring the safety of citizens' lives and property, and preserving territorial integrity and sovereignty, were outlined. The decision to support the transition period and the reconstruction process granted legitimacy to the interim government led by HTS.

The transition period is under the control of HTS, which is officially recognized as a terrorist group by all actors at the table. The Aqaba meeting marked the first step toward overcoming this paradox. Although no HTS representative was present at the meeting, the process was given credit alongside expressions of hope and caution.

Warnings given to HTS regarding minorities may not have a long-lasting impact as Assad is being sidelined. Jolani’s pragmatism is not a choice but a necessity for removing HTS from terrorist organization lists, ensuring international legitimacy, lifting the Caesar Act sanctions, and enabling humanitarian aid. Turkey serves as the guarantor of this “moderation” strategy. By positioning himself as a sponsor of Jolani’s transformation, intelligence chief Kalın implicitly conveys that he is in charge.”

Following Turkey, EU countries are also preparing to reopen their embassies in Damascus, aiming to be close enough to influence Syria’s reshaping. This signals their readiness to accept whatever outcome emerges from the Syrian chaos. They are prepared to offer rewards and concessions, provided HTS oversees the transition and integrates diverse factions into the government.

However, everyone does not share the same vision for Syria. The main contradiction arises between the United States and Turkey. While their priorities align on managing the armed uprising, destabilizing Syria, and securing Israel, their paths diverge when it comes to including the SDF-YPG in the new order. Nonetheless, neither Turkey can reshape Syria without the U.S., nor can the U.S. do so without Turkey. Turkey’s decision to halt operations east of the Euphrates beyond Manbij, despite mobilizing the Syrian National Army (SMO), ahead of Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Ankara and the Jordan meeting, reflects Ankara’s need to consider Washington’s position.

Turkish-American coordination remains vital for legitimizing the new order in Damascus. Still, Ankara is determined to block any pathways that would bring the SDG-PYD faction into a role within the Damascus government. The ceasefire in Manbij is set to expire on December 16. Ahead of this, the SMO’s increased fortifications toward the Euphrates indicate a continued effort to alter the control map. If clashes resume, it will suggest Ankara is willing to escalate tensions to reshape territorial control before a new U.S. administration under Trump takes office.

After bidding farewell to Blinken, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan laid out Turkey’s strategy regarding the eastern Euphrates in an interview with NTV. He argued that the ground enabling the YPG's presence had collapsed with the departure of Russia, Iran, and the Assad regime, adding that the U.S. would also no longer be able to act. “As a result of steps taken by the Damascus administration, the YPG will no longer find a foothold,” he said, making it clear that the YPG will have no place in the new order led by HTS. “They will either disband themselves or be disbanded—that is, they will cease to exist,” he stated.

Fidan outlined a three-stage strategy:
“In the first stage, all foreign terrorist fighters within the YPG, including PKK cadres from Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Europe, must leave the country immediately. In the second stage, the entire YPG command structure, including the Syrians within it, must also leave the country. In the third stage, non-PKK members must disarm, integrate with the new administration through mutual understanding, return to normal life, and continue living in a unified, national, and equitable Syria.”

Fidan claimed that HTS is conscious of preventing harm to the Kurds while eliminating the YPG. In this way, he not only vouched for HTS but also expressed confidence that an organization, that emerged from ISIS, would implement this strategy on Turkey’s behalf.

The U.S. also seeks to maintain the status quo in eastern Syria until it can shape the new order according to its priorities. Additionally, it might find it more functional for Kurds to be among the founding actors in Damascus for U.S.-Israeli interests. Post-2003, the U.S. made Kurds power partners in Baghdad as a safeguard for the new order. In Syria, an allied force is being introduced to counter anti-American Shiites and Sunni groups linked to al-Qaeda.

Meanwhile, the need for cooperation with Turkey has reached its peak, American resistance to Ankara’s strategy may weaken, but the U.S. still does not want to enter the room with a single card.

Currently, the U.S. is pursuing a two-pronged plan.
The first step is urgent: to stop conflicts along the Euphrates without direct force. According to Kurdish officials speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, American commanders promised the SDF to prevent clashes along the Euphrates until a comprehensive political solution was reached. The Americans also met with tribal leaders in Raqqa, Hasakah, and Deir ez-Zor, trying to prevent the dissolution of the Arab components within the SDF. The first signs of this dissolution came in Deir ez-Zor.

The second plan is to ensure Kurdish unity. The French are also involved. The priority target is to form a Kurdish delegation to negotiate with HTS in Damascus. Last week, the U.S. and France met with rival Kurdish parties. Despite the 2012 Hewler Agreement, the Kurdish High Council, aligned with the PYD, and the Syrian Kurdish National Council (ENKS), supported by the Barzanis, could not form a partnership in governance. ENKS parties accused the PYD of monopolizing power and acting like the Baath Party. Mazlum Abdi, the SDF commander, also called for unity among Kurdish parties and sought support from the Kurdistan Regional Government. KDP leader Masoud Barzani would find it difficult to take steps while ignoring Ankara’s red lines. However, according to Fidan’s third-stage solution, Kurdish unity while formally disbanding PYD might not cross Ankara’s red lines. The contradiction here is that Kurdish unity aims to preserve what Ankara wants to see “disappear.”

Abdi also has two requests from the U.S.: sufficient pressure on Ankara to stop Operation Dawn of Freedom and the preservation of U.S. military presence in the region.

The raising of the Syrian opposition flag in eastern Syria was the first step to creating grounds for negotiation. Of course, it didn’t impress President Erdoğan. Defense Minister Yaşar Güler also said, “In the new era, the PKK/YPG terrorist organization in Syria will be eliminated sooner or later. Both the new administration and we want this.” They are very confident about the shape and form of power in Damascus.

On the other hand, the Americans have also started direct talks with HTS. After the meeting in Amman, Blinken announced that they had made direct contact with HTS. This signals a decreasing need for Ankara and indicates that they will no longer be satisfied with the direction given via Turkey. Blinken warned that HTS would face international isolation unless it met these three criteria:

"Protection of all minorities; ensuring that Syrian territory is not turned into a base for threatening neighboring countries; destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles."

We can guess how the sub-clauses of these demands are framed. This is an ultimatum: "You either play by my rules, or you'll be treated as an outcast." HTS's burden is larger than itself. The next process will not be about peacefully taking control of Damascus.

On one hand, there are conflicting desires from foreign actors involved in Syria; on the other, there is the issue of inclusivity with a sectarian mindset taking the wheel in a country with strong ethnic, religious, and sectarian cleavages. In this bind, ensuring Syria’s unity, integrity, and sovereignty, as discussed in Aqaba, will not be easy. Apart from the Kurds, the Druze in Suwayda and the Golan, the Alawites in the Latakia-Tartus region, the Syriacs, Armenians, and other Christian groups, as well as the small numbers of Shiites, Ismailis, and Yazidis, are all on edge. Individuals like Walid Jumblatt, the Druze leader in Lebanon who congratulated Colani, are trying to secure guarantees for the future of the communities they are linked to.

Unlike other minorities, the Kurds, who have a de facto autonomous structure and defense capability, are part of the American plan and stand as a target for Turkey, which requires a much more serious bargaining hand.

A complex equation is forming that could bring back the warning of "Either they disband, or they will be disbanded." For the three-phase strategy to work, America must change its stance, it must secure what it wants from Damascus, and HTS must truly take control. HTS has not even allowed the Syrian National Army, supported by Turkey, inside yet. I don't know what other elements will come into play before the comprehensive government targeted for March is established.

December 10, 2024 The end of an era