Why is Öcalan back in the picture?

We are going through surreal moments. Ever since MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli invited Abdullah Öcalan from İmralı to the Parliament to deliver a speech that would disband the PKK, we have been wondering “what is going on with the state.” This call is not identical to a pre-election attempt to influence the Kurds by getting a letter from İmralı. Undoubtedly, they can also use the 'terror' card in reverse to keep President Tayyip Erdoğan in the palace for one more term and shape the constitution accordingly in order to maintain the MHP's tutelage over the system. The size of the interest determines the depth of the audacity. It is certain that the attack on TUSAŞ in Ankara the following day, regardless of who the apparent perpetrator is, will also serve to fortify the domestic front. If the state is serious about the opening, it will not allow it to be sabotaged. It is also meaningful that this attack took place while the first message from Qandil did not contain a categorical rejection.

It is not without reason that Bahçeli, and not the head of the executive, is speaking. Bahçeli stands out in the change of course in the state. Just as in the past, he surprised by approving the abolition of the death penalty in order to pave the way to the EU, today he is on the verge of hanging the rope he threw in the square to hang Öcalan in his office. Only a figure like Bahçeli can have an impact on the masses that need to be persuaded or on the actors within the system who might sabotage the process. Who better than him to give a new refrain in the opposite direction to the lynch chorus? The motivation to strengthen the domestic front is very prominent. However, the external front surrounding the Kurdish issue is not insignificant at all.

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It is impossible for Bahçeli to make such a move independent of the evaluations between different units of the state. How will it be followed up, will it turn into an opening, will political and legal steps be taken to make it meaningful? Apart from some developments, there is nothing reassuring yet. For now, we can discuss the reasons for this change. If there is a change of course at the state level, what are the factors driving it? In my opinion, regional developments are not less important than domestic political considerations.

So far, three military operations have been organized to dismantle the autonomous administration in northern Syria, which they call the “terror corridor”. Then the target was enlarged; the decision was taken to create a 30 km deep 'safe zone' along the entire border from Syria to Iraq. According to the People's Alliance, this was a matter of survival that required the unity of the state, the government, the opposition, and society. In the end, it became clear that as long as the U.S. was east of the Euphrates, there would be no way out of a corrosive path. It was said, “Let's at least normalize relations with Syria so that we can get rid of the pressure of refugees and dismantle the de facto autonomous structure together with Damascus.” It was seen that normalization with Damascus would not be reciprocated without withdrawing the Turkish troops that were shielding the opposition groups.

Erdoğan's dilemmas are also getting in his own way in his attempt at normalization. First of all, he cannot overcome the limits set by the U.S. First, Washington does not want Turkey to withdraw from the game in Syria. In other words, it wants Turkey to keep its troops west of the Euphrates; to build a barrier in front of the Syrian army in Idlib, Lattakia and Aleppo countryside; not to let Russia-Iran-Syria win; not to shake hands with Damascus until I finish my job in Syria; and to stop targeting the Syrian Democratic Forces!

Secondly, Ankara is both serving American-Israeli interests with the armed groups it supports and confronting Washington over the SDF.

There is a dilemma here. The attempt to normalize relations with Damascus was an attempt to create a rift in this contradiction.

Ankara needs to be ready for possible scenarios in case the U.S. withdraws one day. If the U.S. leaves, what will be the response to the Kurdish reality on the ground? Acceptance or repression? Whatever the answer, they need to be sure of the Kurds in Turkey. And it wants to meet both scenarios with a reconciliation with Damascus. Incidentally, the issue of withdrawal has increased in parallel with the strategic security agreement between Iraq and the United States. According to Reuters, some American forces will leave Iraq by September 2025 and the rest by the end of 2026 under the agreement. The base to be completely vacated by September 2025 is Ain al-Assad in western Anbar province, which is also important for operations in Syria. Indeed, the Americans say they will concentrate on the base in Erbil and remain in Syria. But reducing the military presence in Iraq could make it harder to keep troops in Syria. And if Donald Trump returns after the November 5 elections, he may make unpredictable decisions again. Nevertheless, given the wars it is waging through Israel and its plans for a showdown with Iran, the U.S. withdrawal from the Middle East is all hypothetical. Although the strategy of containing Russia and China in the battle for hegemony has shifted the center of attention, the Middle East remains a crossroads between rival powers.

If Turkey has a new course worth talking about, the point to evaluate is the new developments in the Middle East. Ankara is obviously worried about the possibility that the flames in Gaza could spread to Lebanon and spread to Syria.

Israel's determination to escalate the conflict has rekindled Erdoğan's desire for normalization with Damascus. The quadrilateral table in Moscow was gathering dust after the presidential election in May 2023. Still, Damascus could not be unlocked with an approach that would involve dismantling the autonomous region together with Syria. This is because it refuses to accept the withdrawal of Turkish troops and the cessation of support to armed groups. Why not? Because it cannot overcome the U.S. The American red lines continue with one premise: Turkey should solve the Kurdish problem inside Turkey and form an alliance with the Kurds in Syria! After all, we are in the same camp!

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There is also the Iraqi side in this dilemma. Here, military operations since 2019 have been tied to a clear goal: The complete end of the PKK through military-technical superiority. But in Operation Claw-Lock, the lock could not be closed as promised. Moreover, these operations have further complicated relations with Baghdad. Attempts to involve the Iraqi government in the operations also failed to yield results, despite an incentive agreement such as the Development Road Project. The euphoria over Erdoğan's Baghdad visit 12 years later is hollow. While Ankara was waiting for the PKK to be declared a “terrorist organization”, Baghdad was content to include it as a “banned organization”. This measure does not affect the situation on the ground beyond locking the doors of one or two institutions.

Threatening policies have also made relations with Kurdistan unmanageable. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) is expected to follow the same suit with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) against the PKK and SDF. When PUK head Bafel Talabani turned a deaf ear, he was openly targeted. They also took action to prevent the Kirkuk Governorate from going to the PUK. They tried to form a coalition with the KDP, the Iraqi Turkmen Front, and Arab parties. All of them failed; the governorship knot was solved in favor of the PUK with Baghdad's intervention. Iran is behind the scenes. Also, at the request of the PUK and with Baghdad's consent, the federal court changed the election law that gave the KDP an advantage. The KDP had opposed saying it would not allow the elections, but with Iran's intervention, the elections were held on October 10. The PUK increased its number of seats from 20 to 23. The policy of solving the Kurdish issue with military force has apparently been blocked in many places.

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When the U.S. plans to change the balance of power in the Middle East through Israel are added to this picture, a state of panic emerged. Kurds, who think in terms of Rojava, position themselves as potential allies in the new order on the U.S.-Israel-Gulf axis. In this context, it is assessed that a great opportunity will arise if the counter-axis extending to Syria, Iraq, and Iran collapses.

Even if the fear that “Israel might attack Turkey” is a diversion to design the domestic, developments are pushing Ankara to reposition itself.

It seems as if the state mind has taken action with the assessment “Let's secure the inside of the house so that we don't get caught in the storm.” Do they think that if Turkey gets rid of the tensions with the Kurds, Syria and Iran will be left to weather the storm? Indeed, if Syria falls into turmoil again, the real storm that could blow Turkey away could come from the areas under Turkish military control. But there Erdoğan may be counting on the harmony he has not yet broken with the U.S.

Iran is the main target in the 'new order', which Israel is the instigator of. The PKK positions itself according to developments not only in Syria but also in Iran. Since the Mahsa Amini demonstrations, PJAK has been activated in Qandil. However, PJAK has been in exile in a sense since the 2011 agreement with Iran. The PKK pulled the Iranian cadres it had sent to Syria back to Qandil. Moreover, after a four-year hiatus, PJAK held its seventh congress last April. A new leadership was elected. Kurdish sources say “Qandil is preparing for something big” and point out that the focus could be Iran.

Last year, Iran bombed the camps of Iranian Kurdish parties in the Kurdistan region of Iraq while leaving PJAK untouched. However, PJAK has the potential to be influential in a possible rebellion inside Iran. Iran may think that the double-dealing has not yet lost its relevance. Iran is being selective both because of the sensitive situation at home and because of the equation in Iraq and Syria. The dual game is two-sided. The PKK is also taking advantage of this. But when the big event, whatever it is, comes, the dual game will be over.

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How will Öcalan's call be received when the PKK is lying in ambush in Iran and has made the preservation of autonomy in Syria a strategic priority? Initial reactions are that it is positive to take Öcalan as an interlocutor, that there is no other way to find a solution, that an approach in line with this reality will be welcomed by the Kurdish side, but that maneuvers and special war tactics to get out of the political jam will not be given a premium. Under the current circumstances, the expectation that the PKK will disband itself is unrealistic. When Öcalan knows that he will not be listened to, he leaves it to Qandil, saying, “Let friends evaluate.” Qandil, on the other hand, can say, “The leadership is in captivity and under pressure,” and create a space for itself to escape. The deliberately ambiguous tone prevents a solution between Kandil and İmralı. However, if Öcalan's call comes from the rostrum of parliament, as Bahçeli says, it means that the decision between Kandil and İmralı has already been matured. Otherwise, neither the state nor Öcalan will enter this game. An Öcalan who has lost his influence on the organization and has been exposed is of no use to the state!

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Of course, there are many questions to be asked. For example, Rojava was the decisive issue in the talks in İmralı between 2013 and 2015. The dismantling of the de facto autonomous structure was the goal of the state. For Öcalan, the preservation of Rojava was essential. The return to conflict developed over this kind of confrontation. Until then, Ankara wanted the People's Defense Units (YPG) to act together with the Free Syrian Army against the Assad regime. It was said, “Let's first topple the regime and then the new Syria will decide on the demand for autonomy.” In other words, if the YPG had done as requested, it would have turned into a Turkish-backed organization. If, for example, there was a rapprochement that allowed Öcalan, who is in isolation, to come to the stage, who is standing where in Syria now? Has Öcalan reached the point of disarmament without a change in the red lines of 2013? What (if any) new position of the state say about the autonomous structure? Is the collapse plan still valid? Or has the stage of tacit acceptance been reached? Or is the equation as follows: If the PKK disarms, Ankara will see the autonomous structure as an internal Syrian issue. Or is a solution to integrate the SDF into the Syrian army being tolerated? Or are they saying that the U.S. is already in Syria, what can be done has already been done, let Assad worry about the rest? Or is the U.S. going to leave one day anyway, and then Syria will take care of them with our help? Do they want the PKK to stay away from Turkey and do whatever it does elsewhere? Does this position mean that Turkey will withdraw from the conflicts it is involved in beyond its borders? Or is this all about adapting to the U.S. proposal for a new order? Of course, the U.S. would gladly offer Turkey, the one with free of the Kurdish problem, a guardian role in the new order. NATO member Turkey is the best candidate. A new position that would cause headaches for Iran and Syria would certainly please the U.S. and its allies. Erdoğan's team has already made no secret of its revenge against Iran and Syria.

Of course, there may be nothing that justifies asking these questions. Many questions may seem naïve. Let's ask the simplest one and leave it at that: Is this really an initiative (opening) or not? If it is a new process, what is in it?